-
+
+
+ Enforce restrictions in plperl using an opmask applied to
+ the whole interpreter, instead of using Safe.pm
+ (Tim Bunce, Andrew Dunstan)
+
+
+ Recent developments have convinced us that Safe.pm is too
+ insecure to rely on for making plperl trustable. This
+ change removes use of Safe.pm altogether, in favor of using
+ a separate interpreter with an opcode mask that is always applied.
+ Pleasant side effects of the change include that it is now possible to
+ use Perl's strict pragma in a natural way in
+ plperl, and that Perl's $a and $b
+ variables work as expected in sort routines, and that function
+ compilation is significantly faster. (CVE-2010-1169)
+
+
+
+
+ Prevent PL/Tcl from executing untrustworthy code from
+ pltcl_modules (Tom)
+
+
+ PL/Tcl's feature for autoloading Tcl code from a database table
+ could be exploited for trojan-horse attacks, because there was no
+ restriction on who could create or insert into that table. This change
+ disables the feature unless pltcl_modules is owned by a
+ superuser. (However, the permissions on the table are not checked, so
+ installations that really need a less-than-secure modules table can
+ still grant suitable privileges to trusted non-superusers.) Also,
+ prevent loading code into the unrestricted normal Tcl
+ interpreter unless we are really going to execute a pltclu
+ function. (CVE-2010-1170)
+
+
+
Do not allow an unprivileged user to reset superuser-only parameter
-
+
+
+ Enforce restrictions in plperl using an opmask applied to
+ the whole interpreter, instead of using Safe.pm
+ (Tim Bunce, Andrew Dunstan)
+
+
+ Recent developments have convinced us that Safe.pm is too
+ insecure to rely on for making plperl trustable. This
+ change removes use of Safe.pm altogether, in favor of using
+ a separate interpreter with an opcode mask that is always applied.
+ Pleasant side effects of the change include that it is now possible to
+ use Perl's strict pragma in a natural way in
+ plperl, and that Perl's $a and $b
+ variables work as expected in sort routines, and that function
+ compilation is significantly faster. (CVE-2010-1169)
+
+
+
+
+ Prevent PL/Tcl from executing untrustworthy code from
+ pltcl_modules (Tom)
+
+
+ PL/Tcl's feature for autoloading Tcl code from a database table
+ could be exploited for trojan-horse attacks, because there was no
+ restriction on who could create or insert into that table. This change
+ disables the feature unless pltcl_modules is owned by a
+ superuser. (However, the permissions on the table are not checked, so
+ installations that really need a less-than-secure modules table can
+ still grant suitable privileges to trusted non-superusers.) Also,
+ prevent loading code into the unrestricted normal Tcl
+ interpreter unless we are really going to execute a pltclu
+ function. (CVE-2010-1170)
+
+
+
Do not allow an unprivileged user to reset superuser-only parameter
-
+
+
+ Enforce restrictions in plperl using an opmask applied to
+ the whole interpreter, instead of using Safe.pm
+ (Tim Bunce, Andrew Dunstan)
+
+
+ Recent developments have convinced us that Safe.pm is too
+ insecure to rely on for making plperl trustable. This
+ change removes use of Safe.pm altogether, in favor of using
+ a separate interpreter with an opcode mask that is always applied.
+ Pleasant side effects of the change include that it is now possible to
+ use Perl's strict pragma in a natural way in
+ plperl, and that Perl's $a and $b
+ variables work as expected in sort routines, and that function
+ compilation is significantly faster. (CVE-2010-1169)
+
+
+
+
+ Prevent PL/Tcl from executing untrustworthy code from
+ pltcl_modules (Tom)
+
+
+ PL/Tcl's feature for autoloading Tcl code from a database table
+ could be exploited for trojan-horse attacks, because there was no
+ restriction on who could create or insert into that table. This change
+ disables the feature unless pltcl_modules is owned by a
+ superuser. (However, the permissions on the table are not checked, so
+ installations that really need a less-than-secure modules table can
+ still grant suitable privileges to trusted non-superusers.) Also,
+ prevent loading code into the unrestricted normal Tcl
+ interpreter unless we are really going to execute a pltclu
+ function. (CVE-2010-1170)
+
+
+
Do not allow an unprivileged user to reset superuser-only parameter
-
+
+
+ Enforce restrictions in plperl using an opmask applied to
+ the whole interpreter, instead of using Safe.pm
+ (Tim Bunce, Andrew Dunstan)
+
+
+ Recent developments have convinced us that Safe.pm is too
+ insecure to rely on for making plperl trustable. This
+ change removes use of Safe.pm altogether, in favor of using
+ a separate interpreter with an opcode mask that is always applied.
+ Pleasant side effects of the change include that it is now possible to
+ use Perl's strict pragma in a natural way in
+ plperl, and that Perl's $a and $b
+ variables work as expected in sort routines, and that function
+ compilation is significantly faster. (CVE-2010-1169)
+
+
+
+
+ Prevent PL/Tcl from executing untrustworthy code from
+ pltcl_modules (Tom)
+
+
+ PL/Tcl's feature for autoloading Tcl code from a database table
+ could be exploited for trojan-horse attacks, because there was no
+ restriction on who could create or insert into that table. This change
+ disables the feature unless pltcl_modules is owned by a
+ superuser. (However, the permissions on the table are not checked, so
+ installations that really need a less-than-secure modules table can
+ still grant suitable privileges to trusted non-superusers.) Also,
+ prevent loading code into the unrestricted normal Tcl
+ interpreter unless we are really going to execute a pltclu
+ function. (CVE-2010-1170)
+
+
+
Fix possible crash if a cache reset message is received during
-
+
+
+ Enforce restrictions in plperl using an opmask applied to
+ the whole interpreter, instead of using Safe.pm
+ (Tim Bunce, Andrew Dunstan)
+
+
+ Recent developments have convinced us that Safe.pm is too
+ insecure to rely on for making plperl trustable. This
+ change removes use of Safe.pm altogether, in favor of using
+ a separate interpreter with an opcode mask that is always applied.
+ Pleasant side effects of the change include that it is now possible to
+ use Perl's strict pragma in a natural way in
+ plperl, and that Perl's $a and $b
+ variables work as expected in sort routines, and that function
+ compilation is significantly faster. (CVE-2010-1169)
+
+
+
+
+ Prevent PL/Tcl from executing untrustworthy code from
+ pltcl_modules (Tom)
+
+
+ PL/Tcl's feature for autoloading Tcl code from a database table
+ could be exploited for trojan-horse attacks, because there was no
+ restriction on who could create or insert into that table. This change
+ disables the feature unless pltcl_modules is owned by a
+ superuser. (However, the permissions on the table are not checked, so
+ installations that really need a less-than-secure modules table can
+ still grant suitable privileges to trusted non-superusers.) Also,
+ prevent loading code into the unrestricted normal Tcl
+ interpreter unless we are really going to execute a pltclu
+ function. (CVE-2010-1170)
+
+
+
Fix possible crash if a cache reset message is received during
-
+
- Fix error during WAL replay of ALTER ... SET TABLESPACE
- (Tom)
+ Enforce restrictions in plperl using an opmask applied to
+ the whole interpreter, instead of using Safe.pm
+ (Tim Bunce, Andrew Dunstan)
+
+
+ Recent developments have convinced us that Safe.pm is too
+ insecure to rely on for making plperl trustable. This
+ change removes use of Safe.pm altogether, in favor of using
+ a separate interpreter with an opcode mask that is always applied.
+ Pleasant side effects of the change include that it is now possible to
+ use Perl's strict pragma in a natural way in
+ plperl, and that Perl's $a and $b
+ variables work as expected in sort routines, and that function
+ compilation is significantly faster. (CVE-2010-1169)
+
+
+
+
+ Prevent PL/Tcl from executing untrustworthy code from
+ pltcl_modules (Tom)
+
+
+ PL/Tcl's feature for autoloading Tcl code from a database table
+ could be exploited for trojan-horse attacks, because there was no
+ restriction on who could create or insert into that table. This change
+ disables the feature unless pltcl_modules is owned by a
+ superuser. (However, the permissions on the table are not checked, so
+ installations that really need a less-than-secure modules table can
+ still grant suitable privileges to trusted non-superusers.) Also,
+ prevent loading code into the unrestricted normal Tcl
+ interpreter unless we are really going to execute a pltclu
+ function. (CVE-2010-1170)
+
+
+
+
+ Fix data corruption during WAL replay of
+ ALTER ... SET TABLESPACE (Tom)
projects / postgresql.git / commitdiff