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sqlmap - security
development in
    Miroslav Štampar
Who are we?
 Bernardo Damele A. G. (@inquisb)
     Security Consultant / White-hat hacker
     NGS Secure
     London / UK
     Lots of conference talks
 Miroslav Stampar (@stamparm)
     Professional software developer
     AVL Croatia
     Zagreb / Croatia
     First conference talk

EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)        June 23, 2011   2
What is sqlmap?
 “sqlmap is an open source penetration testing
  tool that automates the process of detecting
  and exploiting SQL injection flaws and taking
  over of database server(s)”
 AIO (All-In-One) SQL injection tool
 Over 10k updates and/or downloads monthly
 Part of popular security distros: Backtrack,
  Backbox, Web Security Dojo, OWASP Web
  Testing,...



EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)   June 23, 2011   3
Short history
 Daniele Bellucci (@belch) – July 25th of 2006 –
  birthday of sqlmap
 September 2006 – Daniele leaves the project,
  Bernardo takes it over
 December 2009 – Miroslav replies to the call for
  developers




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)     June 23, 2011   4
Current status (v1.0-dev)
 Powerful detection engine
 State of the art enumeration engine
 Takeover functionalities (Metasploit,...)
 Support for IDS/WAF evasion in form of
  “tampering” scripts
 Numerous optimizations
 Remote file manipulation
 Brute force methods



EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)      June 23, 2011   5
Short future
 GUI
 Professional reporting (XML, PDF,...)
 Out-of-Band (OOB) advanced techniques
 Support for few DBMSes left
 Generic lexical SQL parser
 Advanced IDS/WAF evasion techniques
 Upgrade to Python 3




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)   June 23, 2011   6
Project statistics (ohloh.net)
 Languages used



 LOC (Lines of code)




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)   June 23, 2011   7
Features
 Fully supported backend DBMSes (and
  growing): MySQL, Oracle, PostgreSQL, Microsoft
  SQL Server, Microsoft Access, SQLite, Firebird,
  Sybase and SAP MaxDB
 Fully supported SQL injection techniques:
  Blind, Error, Union (partial & full), Timed,
  Stacked
 Enumeration of: database users, users'
  password hashes, users' privileges, users'
  roles, databases, tables and columns


EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)    June 23, 2011   8
Features (2)
 Recognition and cracking of password hashes
 Web server file upload/download
 Arbitrary command execution and retrieval of
  standard output
 Establishment of an out-of-band TCP/UDP
  connection between the attacker's machine
  and the database server




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)   June 23, 2011   9
Community
 Huge pool of pen/beta-testers active at our
  mailing list (this moment 200 subscribed)
 White/Grey/Black hat hackers
 They all provide indispensable help by:
     Reporting problems/bugs from real-life scenarios
     Feature requests
     Keeping morale high
     Modest donations (covering SVN server costs)




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)        June 23, 2011   10
SQL injection for dummies
 Vulnerable code (PHP/PgSQL):
    $query =
Well known attacks
 In period 2005 till 2007 Albert Gonzalez has
  stolen 130 million credit card numbers
 June 2007 – Microsoft U.K. Website defaced
 December 2009 – RockYou (32 million
  credentials stolen)
 December 2009 – NASA
 July 2010 – The Pirate Bay




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)    June 23, 2011   12
Well known attacks (2)
 February 2011 – HBGary
 March 2011 – MySQL (vulnerable page has
  been:
    http://mysql.com/customers/view/index.html?id=1170
 March & May 2011 – Comodo (certificate
  reseller)
 May 2011... – PBS, Sony (#sownage – 20 sites
  and counting), Fox, Infragard, Nintendo, CNN...




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)          June 23, 2011   13
Lizamoon (mass injection)
 “LizaMoon mass injection hits over 226,000 URLs” -
  Websense Security Labs (29th Mar 2011)
 “The world was rocked today by LizaMoon - a SQL
  injection attack which has compromised well over
  one million Websites” – PCWorld (2nd Apr 2011)




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)      June 23, 2011   14
Random Quote




      “Structured Query Language is becoming the
              Achilles heel of the Internet.”




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)     June 23, 2011   15
“Exploits of a Mom” (XKCD #327)




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)   June 23, 2011   16
Funny Sweds
 The following lines were in Swedish election votes (swe.
  VALJ = engl. voting):
  ;13;Hallands län;80;Halmstad;01;Halmstads
  västra valkrets;0904;Söndrum 4;pwn DROP TABLE
  VALJ;1
 “At least 'pwn DROP TABLE VALJ' got 1 vote in the
  Swedish election” (comment on reddit :)




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)           June 23, 2011   17
Форум АНТИЧАТ - SQL Инъекции
 “Awkward” Russian underground (open) forum
 No chat, only vulnerable targets
 Around 14 thousand targets (and growing)
  available to anyone




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)   June 23, 2011   18
Blind-based technique
 Also known as “boolean” based and/or “1=1”
 4 out of 5 vulnerable cases are affected
 Slow – 1 request per 1 bit of information
 Very demanding and sensitive for
  implementation (detection part)
 Differentiation approach (difflib.quick_ratio())
  or “exact” approach (e.g. “You are logged in” in
  page)
 Greatest obstacle is “dinamicity”
 Multi-threading is most welcome

EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)     June 23, 2011   19
Blind-based technique (2)
 Original



 “True”



 “False”




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)   June 23, 2011   20
Error-based technique
 1 out of 4 vulnerable cases are affected
 Deliberate provoking of “invalid SQL query”
  and retrieval of information from response
  messages
 Fast – 1 request per item of information
 Easy detection and implementation
 Greatest obstacle is trimming of error
  messages (“substringing”)
 Too DBMS specific
 Advice: Turn off the error/debug messages!

EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)    June 23, 2011   21
Error-based technique (2)
 Example:




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)   June 23, 2011   22
Union query technique
 Also known as “inband”
 1 out of 2 vulnerable cases are affected
 Fast(est) – 1 request per (multiple) item of
  information
 Partial vs Full union
 Greatest obstacle is speed of detection part
 Easy for implementation, at least for usage
  part




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)    June 23, 2011   23
Union query technique (2)
 Example 1 (partial):




 Example 2 (full):




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)   June 23, 2011   24
Time delay-based technique
 Pretty much the same as blind-based
 Among slowest – 1 request per 1 bit of
  information
 Expect every second response to be delayed
 Very demanding and sensitive for
  implementation
 Greatest obstacle is “lagging”
 Single threading is a must for stable data
  retrieval


EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)   June 23, 2011   25
Time delay-based technique (2)
 Example (delayed by 5 seconds):




 Resulting SQL statement:
  SELECT * FROM users WHERE id=1 AND 1=
    (SELECT 1 FROM PG_SLEEP(5))--




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)   June 23, 2011   26
Stacked query technique
 Pretty much identical to the time-based
 Around 1 out of 2 DBMSes supports it
 Deadly (Lizamoon)
 MsSQL is most affected
 Non-query based commands (INSERT,
  DELETE,...)




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)    June 23, 2011   27
Stacked query technique (2)
 Example (delayed by 5 seconds)




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)   June 23, 2011   28
Basic working examples
 Blind-based: ...id=1 AND ASCII(SUBSTR((SELECT
    password FROM public.users OFFSET 0 LIMIT
    1)::text,1,1)) > 64--
 Error-based: ...id=1 AND 6561=CAST(':abc:'||
    (SELECT password FROM public.users OFFSET 0
    LIMIT 1)::text||':def:' AS NUMERIC)--
 Union query: ...id=1 UNION ALL SELECT NULL,
    NULL,':abc:'||password||':def:'||':ghi:'||
    password||':jkl:'||':mno:'||id||':pqr:' FROM
    public.users--




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)      June 23, 2011   29
Basic working examples (2)
 Time-delay based: id=1 AND 1924=(CASE WHEN
    (ASCII(SUBSTR((SELECT password FROM
    public.users OFFSET 0 LIMIT 1)::text,1,1)) >
    64) THEN (SELECT 1924 FROM PG_SLEEP(1)) ELSE
    1924 END)--
 Stacked query: id=1; SELECT(CASE WHEN
    (ASCII(SUBSTR((SELECT password FROM
    public.users OFFSET 0 LIMIT 1)::text,1,1)) >
    64) THEN (SELECT 1924 FROM PG_SLEEP(1)) ELSE
    1924 END);--




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)      June 23, 2011   30
Program's structure
 doc – manual, THANKS,...
 lib – core modules
 extra – 3rd party modules (chardet,
  clientform,...)
 plugins – DBMS specific modules
 shell – stagers and backdoors (php, jsp,
  asp,...)
 tamper – tampering scripts (ifnull2ifisnull,...)
 txt – wordlist, user-agents,...
 xml – queries, payloads,...

EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)       June 23, 2011   31
Program's workflow

            Setup        Detection   Fingerprinting   Enumeration    Takeover




         Configuration   Boolean        MySQL         Databases      Web shell

          Knowledge
                           Error        MsSQL           Tables      Metasploit
            base

           Session        Union         PgSQL          Columns        ICMPsh


         Connection       Timed         Oracle          Users       File access


           Payloads      Stacked      MsAccess        Passwords      Registry


           Queries                         ...            ...           ...


             ...
EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)                                   June 23, 2011   32
Development environment
 Subversion (version control)
 Redmine (project management)
 Python 2.6 and/or 2.7
 Text editor of choice (TC/Notepad++ on
  Windows, Krusader/KrViewer on Linux)
 Debugger of choice (pdb)
 Proxy MITM tool (Burp)
 Web browser of choice (Firefox)



EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)   June 23, 2011   33
Testing environment
 VMWare virtual machines
 Linux Debian 5.0 32-bit (most used one)
     Apache/PHP
          MySQL, Oracle, PgSQL, Firebird, SQLite
 Windows XP 32-bit
     XAMPP/PHP
          MySQL, SAP MaxDB, Sybase, SQLite, Access, etc.
     IIS/ASP(.NET)
          MsSQL, MySQL, etc.




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)              June 23, 2011   34
Inference (binary search)
 O(Log2n) complexity
 Can be used in boolean, timed and stacked
 e.g.:
     Initial table      ['A','B',...'Z']
     AND (...)          > 'M' → (True) → ['N',...'Z']
     AND (...)          > 'S' → (False) → ['N',...'S']
     AND (...)          > 'O' → (True) → ['P', 'R', 'S']
     AND (...)          > 'R' → (False) → ['P', 'R']
     AND (...)          > 'P' → (False) → ['P'] (resulting
      char)

EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)                 June 23, 2011   35
Character prediction
 High probability of prefix reuse
 Common DBMS identificator names
 Dynamic “prediction” tree
 Example:
     Input: CREATE SYNONYM, CREATE TABLE,
      CREATE TRIGGER, CREATE USER, CREATE VIEW
     Output tree: [C][R][E][A][T][E][S|T|U|V]
 Appropriate for blind/time/stacked techniques




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)    June 23, 2011   36
“Null-connection”
 Special HTTP requests (Web server specific)
 Example (Apache):
     Request: Range: bytes=-1
     Response: Content-range: bytes 74-74/75 (True)
     Response: Content-range: bytes 126-126/127
      (False)
 Example (IIS):
     Request: HEAD
     Response: Content-Length: 75 (True)
     Response: Content-Length: 127 (False)


EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)       June 23, 2011   37
Dinamicity removal
 Biggest obstacle of blind/boolean technique
 Javascript, ads, banners,...
 Differentiation approach (difflib)
 “Static blocks” vs “Dynamic blocks” (gaps)
 Regular expressions to the rescue
 Example:
     </p></table>dynamic part<iframe><ul>
     r“</p></table>.*?<iframe><ul>”




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)    June 23, 2011   38
Reflective values
 Copy of payload (encoded?) inside response
 Causing problems for blind/boolean technique
 Source of lots of false positives/negatives (in
  other tools :)
 Regular expressions to the rescue
 Example:
     ?id=1 AND 2>1
     ?id=1%20AND%202%3e1
     r“(?i)id[^n<]+1[^n<]+AND[^n<]+2[^n<]
      +1”

EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)     June 23, 2011   39
Statistics is our friend
 Normal distribution (bell curve)




 “It shows how much variation or 'dispersion'
  there is from the average (mean, or expected
  value)”
 99.9999999997440% of “normal” data inside 7σ
EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)    June 23, 2011   40
Statistics is our friend (2)
 UNION injection detection:
     id=1 UNION ALL SELECT NULL, NULL,...
     Right number of columns should stick out
 Time-delay injection detection/usage:
     id=1 AND 1=SELECT 1 FROM PG_SLEEP(5))--
     Response time should stick out
 Stacked-query injection detection/usage:
     id=1; SELECT 1 FROM PG_SLEEP(5))--
     Response time should stick out



EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)      June 23, 2011   41
False positives
 Boolean, timed and stacked affected
 Example: search engine queries
 Simple arithmetic tests
 Searching for mere signs of “intelligence”
 Example:
     1+2==3
     4==5
     2==(7-5)
     (6+5)==(6-5)



EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)     June 23, 2011   42
Heuristic test
 “Blatant” logic used for detection
 Insufficient but great one shot test
 Parameter “poisoning” with invalid (SQL) chars
 Example:
     ?id=1''))(“(''(
 Error message parsing and DBMS recognition




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)    June 23, 2011   43
Tampering scripts
 IDS/WAF applications are getting better
 Need for anti-anti hacking techniques
 Example:
     'UNION SELECT' → 'UnIOn SeleCT'
     'A>B' → 'A NOT BETWEEN 0 AND B'
     'SELECT password' → 'SELECT/**/password'
 Input: payload Output: ftamper(payload)
 Order of appearance & prioritized
 14 till now and counting
 Automation in near future

EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)     June 23, 2011   44
“Pivoting”
 Dumping technique
 When lacking LIMIT/OFFSET mechanism
 Around 1 in 2 DBMSes affected (e.g. MsSQL)
 Count number of DISTINCT values
 Choose column with highest number as “pivot”
 Pivoting:
     SELECT MIN(pivotCol) … WHERE pivotCol >
      <previous_pivot_value>
     SELECT otherCol … WHERE pivotCol =
      <current_pivot_value>

EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)   June 23, 2011   45
“SQL harvesting”
 Google is our friend
     filetype:sql "CREATE TABLE"
     filetype:sql "INSERT INTO"
 Extraction of table and column names
 Decision based on frequency
 Gathered data used by (brute force switches):
     --common-tables
          ...AND EXISTS(SELECT * FROM table)
     --common-columns
          ...AND EXISTS(SELECT column FROM table)


EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)        June 23, 2011   46
Hash cracking
 Implemented DBMS specific hash functions
 10 and counting (mysql_passwd,
  mysql_old_passwd, mssql_passwd, ...)
 Regular expression based recognition
 High-quality (10MB) dictionary/wordlist
 Automatic brute-force approach
 Blazing fast (core routines from hashlib)




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)   June 23, 2011   47
Quality tests
 --live-test
     All relevant tests for 4 major DBMSes
     Batch-like workflow
     Declared in a structured XML file
     Run against testing VMs
 --smoke-test
     Recursively finds all modules
     Tries importing every single one of them
     Runs doctests if explicitly written
 ./extra/shutils/pylint.py


EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)        June 23, 2011   48
Best “self-protection” advice




     ...you can get from a dude that makes this all
     anti WAF/IDS, statistics, pivoting, dynamicity,
     reflective values and similar mambo-jambo...




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)       June 23, 2011   49
Parametrized SQL statements
 Don't sanitize your database inputs yourself
  (prone to errors!)
 Use language/library specific parametrized SQL
  statements
 Functions/libraries automatically sanitize
  provided parameters
 Good reference: http://bobby-tables.com/




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)   June 23, 2011   50
Parametrized SQL statements (2)
 Example (Python DB API):
     Don't:
          cmd =
Questions?




EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)   June 23, 2011   52
Join the project
 Project's web page:
    http://sqlmap.sourceforge.net/
 Contact:
    dev@sqlmap.org
 Users list:
    sqlmap-users@lists.sourceforge.net
 Twitter:
    @sqlmap
 Repository:
    https://svn.sqlmap.org/sqlmap/trunk/sqlmap

EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy)        June 23, 2011   53

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sqlmap - security development in Python

  • 1. sqlmap - security development in Miroslav Štampar
  • 2. Who are we?  Bernardo Damele A. G. (@inquisb) Security Consultant / White-hat hacker NGS Secure London / UK Lots of conference talks  Miroslav Stampar (@stamparm) Professional software developer AVL Croatia Zagreb / Croatia First conference talk EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 2
  • 3. What is sqlmap?  “sqlmap is an open source penetration testing tool that automates the process of detecting and exploiting SQL injection flaws and taking over of database server(s)”  AIO (All-In-One) SQL injection tool  Over 10k updates and/or downloads monthly  Part of popular security distros: Backtrack, Backbox, Web Security Dojo, OWASP Web Testing,... EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 3
  • 4. Short history  Daniele Bellucci (@belch) – July 25th of 2006 – birthday of sqlmap  September 2006 – Daniele leaves the project, Bernardo takes it over  December 2009 – Miroslav replies to the call for developers EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 4
  • 5. Current status (v1.0-dev)  Powerful detection engine  State of the art enumeration engine  Takeover functionalities (Metasploit,...)  Support for IDS/WAF evasion in form of “tampering” scripts  Numerous optimizations  Remote file manipulation  Brute force methods EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 5
  • 6. Short future  GUI  Professional reporting (XML, PDF,...)  Out-of-Band (OOB) advanced techniques  Support for few DBMSes left  Generic lexical SQL parser  Advanced IDS/WAF evasion techniques  Upgrade to Python 3 EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 6
  • 7. Project statistics (ohloh.net)  Languages used  LOC (Lines of code) EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 7
  • 8. Features  Fully supported backend DBMSes (and growing): MySQL, Oracle, PostgreSQL, Microsoft SQL Server, Microsoft Access, SQLite, Firebird, Sybase and SAP MaxDB  Fully supported SQL injection techniques: Blind, Error, Union (partial & full), Timed, Stacked  Enumeration of: database users, users' password hashes, users' privileges, users' roles, databases, tables and columns EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 8
  • 9. Features (2)  Recognition and cracking of password hashes  Web server file upload/download  Arbitrary command execution and retrieval of standard output  Establishment of an out-of-band TCP/UDP connection between the attacker's machine and the database server EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 9
  • 10. Community  Huge pool of pen/beta-testers active at our mailing list (this moment 200 subscribed)  White/Grey/Black hat hackers  They all provide indispensable help by: Reporting problems/bugs from real-life scenarios Feature requests Keeping morale high Modest donations (covering SVN server costs) EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 10
  • 11. SQL injection for dummies  Vulnerable code (PHP/PgSQL): $query = "SELECT * FROM products WHERE product_id=" . $_GET['id']  Attack vector: http://www.store.com/store.php?id=7; DROP TABLE users  Resulting SQL statements: SELECT * FROM products WHERE product_id=7; DROP TABLE users EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 11
  • 12. Well known attacks  In period 2005 till 2007 Albert Gonzalez has stolen 130 million credit card numbers  June 2007 – Microsoft U.K. Website defaced  December 2009 – RockYou (32 million credentials stolen)  December 2009 – NASA  July 2010 – The Pirate Bay EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 12
  • 13. Well known attacks (2)  February 2011 – HBGary  March 2011 – MySQL (vulnerable page has been: http://mysql.com/customers/view/index.html?id=1170  March & May 2011 – Comodo (certificate reseller)  May 2011... – PBS, Sony (#sownage – 20 sites and counting), Fox, Infragard, Nintendo, CNN... EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 13
  • 14. Lizamoon (mass injection)  “LizaMoon mass injection hits over 226,000 URLs” - Websense Security Labs (29th Mar 2011)  “The world was rocked today by LizaMoon - a SQL injection attack which has compromised well over one million Websites” – PCWorld (2nd Apr 2011) EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 14
  • 15. Random Quote “Structured Query Language is becoming the Achilles heel of the Internet.” EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 15
  • 16. “Exploits of a Mom” (XKCD #327) EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 16
  • 17. Funny Sweds  The following lines were in Swedish election votes (swe. VALJ = engl. voting): ;13;Hallands län;80;Halmstad;01;Halmstads västra valkrets;0904;Söndrum 4;pwn DROP TABLE VALJ;1  “At least 'pwn DROP TABLE VALJ' got 1 vote in the Swedish election” (comment on reddit :) EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 17
  • 18. Форум АНТИЧАТ - SQL Инъекции  “Awkward” Russian underground (open) forum  No chat, only vulnerable targets  Around 14 thousand targets (and growing) available to anyone EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 18
  • 19. Blind-based technique  Also known as “boolean” based and/or “1=1”  4 out of 5 vulnerable cases are affected  Slow – 1 request per 1 bit of information  Very demanding and sensitive for implementation (detection part)  Differentiation approach (difflib.quick_ratio()) or “exact” approach (e.g. “You are logged in” in page)  Greatest obstacle is “dinamicity”  Multi-threading is most welcome EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 19
  • 20. Blind-based technique (2)  Original  “True”  “False” EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 20
  • 21. Error-based technique  1 out of 4 vulnerable cases are affected  Deliberate provoking of “invalid SQL query” and retrieval of information from response messages  Fast – 1 request per item of information  Easy detection and implementation  Greatest obstacle is trimming of error messages (“substringing”)  Too DBMS specific  Advice: Turn off the error/debug messages! EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 21
  • 22. Error-based technique (2)  Example: EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 22
  • 23. Union query technique  Also known as “inband”  1 out of 2 vulnerable cases are affected  Fast(est) – 1 request per (multiple) item of information  Partial vs Full union  Greatest obstacle is speed of detection part  Easy for implementation, at least for usage part EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 23
  • 24. Union query technique (2)  Example 1 (partial):  Example 2 (full): EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 24
  • 25. Time delay-based technique  Pretty much the same as blind-based  Among slowest – 1 request per 1 bit of information  Expect every second response to be delayed  Very demanding and sensitive for implementation  Greatest obstacle is “lagging”  Single threading is a must for stable data retrieval EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 25
  • 26. Time delay-based technique (2)  Example (delayed by 5 seconds):  Resulting SQL statement: SELECT * FROM users WHERE id=1 AND 1= (SELECT 1 FROM PG_SLEEP(5))-- EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 26
  • 27. Stacked query technique  Pretty much identical to the time-based  Around 1 out of 2 DBMSes supports it  Deadly (Lizamoon)  MsSQL is most affected  Non-query based commands (INSERT, DELETE,...) EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 27
  • 28. Stacked query technique (2)  Example (delayed by 5 seconds) EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 28
  • 29. Basic working examples  Blind-based: ...id=1 AND ASCII(SUBSTR((SELECT password FROM public.users OFFSET 0 LIMIT 1)::text,1,1)) > 64--  Error-based: ...id=1 AND 6561=CAST(':abc:'|| (SELECT password FROM public.users OFFSET 0 LIMIT 1)::text||':def:' AS NUMERIC)--  Union query: ...id=1 UNION ALL SELECT NULL, NULL,':abc:'||password||':def:'||':ghi:'|| password||':jkl:'||':mno:'||id||':pqr:' FROM public.users-- EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 29
  • 30. Basic working examples (2)  Time-delay based: id=1 AND 1924=(CASE WHEN (ASCII(SUBSTR((SELECT password FROM public.users OFFSET 0 LIMIT 1)::text,1,1)) > 64) THEN (SELECT 1924 FROM PG_SLEEP(1)) ELSE 1924 END)--  Stacked query: id=1; SELECT(CASE WHEN (ASCII(SUBSTR((SELECT password FROM public.users OFFSET 0 LIMIT 1)::text,1,1)) > 64) THEN (SELECT 1924 FROM PG_SLEEP(1)) ELSE 1924 END);-- EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 30
  • 31. Program's structure  doc – manual, THANKS,...  lib – core modules  extra – 3rd party modules (chardet, clientform,...)  plugins – DBMS specific modules  shell – stagers and backdoors (php, jsp, asp,...)  tamper – tampering scripts (ifnull2ifisnull,...)  txt – wordlist, user-agents,...  xml – queries, payloads,... EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 31
  • 32. Program's workflow Setup Detection Fingerprinting Enumeration Takeover Configuration Boolean MySQL Databases Web shell Knowledge Error MsSQL Tables Metasploit base Session Union PgSQL Columns ICMPsh Connection Timed Oracle Users File access Payloads Stacked MsAccess Passwords Registry Queries ... ... ... ... EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 32
  • 33. Development environment  Subversion (version control)  Redmine (project management)  Python 2.6 and/or 2.7  Text editor of choice (TC/Notepad++ on Windows, Krusader/KrViewer on Linux)  Debugger of choice (pdb)  Proxy MITM tool (Burp)  Web browser of choice (Firefox) EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 33
  • 34. Testing environment  VMWare virtual machines  Linux Debian 5.0 32-bit (most used one) Apache/PHP  MySQL, Oracle, PgSQL, Firebird, SQLite  Windows XP 32-bit XAMPP/PHP  MySQL, SAP MaxDB, Sybase, SQLite, Access, etc. IIS/ASP(.NET)  MsSQL, MySQL, etc. EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 34
  • 35. Inference (binary search)  O(Log2n) complexity  Can be used in boolean, timed and stacked  e.g.: Initial table ['A','B',...'Z'] AND (...) > 'M' → (True) → ['N',...'Z'] AND (...) > 'S' → (False) → ['N',...'S'] AND (...) > 'O' → (True) → ['P', 'R', 'S'] AND (...) > 'R' → (False) → ['P', 'R'] AND (...) > 'P' → (False) → ['P'] (resulting char) EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 35
  • 36. Character prediction  High probability of prefix reuse  Common DBMS identificator names  Dynamic “prediction” tree  Example: Input: CREATE SYNONYM, CREATE TABLE, CREATE TRIGGER, CREATE USER, CREATE VIEW Output tree: [C][R][E][A][T][E][S|T|U|V]  Appropriate for blind/time/stacked techniques EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 36
  • 37. “Null-connection”  Special HTTP requests (Web server specific)  Example (Apache): Request: Range: bytes=-1 Response: Content-range: bytes 74-74/75 (True) Response: Content-range: bytes 126-126/127 (False)  Example (IIS): Request: HEAD Response: Content-Length: 75 (True) Response: Content-Length: 127 (False) EuroPython 2011, Florence (Italy) June 23, 2011 37
  • 38. Dinamicity removal  Biggest obstacle of blind/boolean technique  Javascript, ads, banners,...  Differentiation approach (difflib)  “Static blocks” vs “Dynamic blocks” (gaps)  Regular expressions to the rescue  Example: 

    dynamic part