Minor editorialization for be-secure.c: fix comments and some formatting

infelicities.

diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index 9080b133b2509d715bc757b5d5a57855a6e19ef0..f74f8f92757081b3fc825bb31680bcae8ab7868b 100644 (file)
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -11,13 +11,13 @@
  *
  *
  * IDENTIFICATION
- *   $PostgreSQL: pgsql/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c,v 1.100 2010/05/26 15:52:37 tgl Exp $
+ *   $PostgreSQL: pgsql/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c,v 1.101 2010/05/26 16:15:57 tgl Exp $
  *
  *   Since the server static private key ($DataDir/server.key)
  *   will normally be stored unencrypted so that the database
  *   backend can restart automatically, it is important that
  *   we select an algorithm that continues to provide confidentiality
- *   even if the attacker has the server's private key.  Empheral
+ *   even if the attacker has the server's private key.  Ephemeral
  *   DH (EDH) keys provide this, and in fact provide Perfect Forward
  *   Secrecy (PFS) except for situations where the session can
  *   be hijacked during a periodic handshake/renegotiation.
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ char       *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
 /* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
 
 /*
- * Hardcoded DH parameters, used in empheral DH keying.
+ * Hardcoded DH parameters, used in ephemeral DH keying.
  * As discussed above, EDH protects the confidentiality of
  * sessions even if the static private key is compromised,
  * so we are *highly* motivated to ensure that we can use
@@ -411,7 +411,6 @@ wloop:
  * directly so it gets passed through the socket/signals layer on Win32.
  *
  * They are closely modelled on the original socket implementations in OpenSSL.
- *
  */
 
 static bool my_bio_initialized = false;
@@ -501,7 +500,7 @@ err:
  * to verify that the DBA-generated DH parameters file contains
  * what we expect it to contain.
  */
-static DH  *
+static DH *
 load_dh_file(int keylength)
 {
    FILE       *fp;
@@ -559,7 +558,7 @@ load_dh_file(int keylength)
  * To prevent problems if the DH parameters files don't even
  * exist, we can load DH parameters hardcoded into this file.
  */
-static DH  *
+static DH *
 load_dh_buffer(const char *buffer, size_t len)
 {
    BIO        *bio;
@@ -579,7 +578,7 @@ load_dh_buffer(const char *buffer, size_t len)
 }
 
 /*
- * Generate an empheral DH key.  Because this can take a long
+ * Generate an ephemeral DH key.  Because this can take a long
  * time to compute, we can use precomputed parameters of the
  * common key sizes.
  *
@@ -591,7 +590,7 @@ load_dh_buffer(const char *buffer, size_t len)
  * the OpenSSL library can efficiently generate random keys from
  * the information provided.
  */
-static DH  *
+static DH *
 tmp_dh_cb(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength)
 {
    DH         *r = NULL;
@@ -737,7 +736,7 @@ initialize_SSL(void)
                            SSLerrmessage())));
 
        /*
-        * Load and verify certificate and private key
+        * Load and verify server's certificate and private key
         */
        if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_context,
                                               SERVER_CERT_FILE) != 1)
@@ -782,11 +781,11 @@ initialize_SSL(void)
                            SSLerrmessage())));
    }
 
-   /* set up empheral DH keys */
+   /* set up ephemeral DH keys, and disallow SSL v2 while at it */
    SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_context, tmp_dh_cb);
    SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_context, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
 
-   /* setup the allowed cipher list */
+   /* set up the allowed cipher list */
    if (SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_context, SSLCipherSuites) != 1)
        elog(FATAL, "could not set the cipher list (no valid ciphers available)");
 
@@ -794,42 +793,38 @@ initialize_SSL(void)
     * Attempt to load CA store, so we can verify client certificates if
     * needed.
     */
-   if (access(ROOT_CERT_FILE, R_OK))
-   {
-       ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
+   ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
 
+   if (access(ROOT_CERT_FILE, R_OK) != 0)
+   {
        /*
-        * If root certificate file simply not found. Don't log an error here,
+        * If root certificate file simply not found, don't log an error here,
         * because it's quite likely the user isn't planning on using client
         * certificates. If we can't access it for other reasons, it is an
         * error.
         */
        if (errno != ENOENT)
-       {
            ereport(FATAL,
                 (errmsg("could not access root certificate file \"%s\": %m",
                         ROOT_CERT_FILE)));
-       }
    }
    else if (SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_context, ROOT_CERT_FILE, NULL) != 1 ||
             (root_cert_list = SSL_load_client_CA_file(ROOT_CERT_FILE)) == NULL)
    {
        /*
         * File was there, but we could not load it. This means the file is
-        * somehow broken, and we cannot do verification at all - so abort
-        * here.
+        * somehow broken, and we cannot do verification at all - so fail.
         */
-       ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
        ereport(FATAL,
                (errmsg("could not load root certificate file \"%s\": %s",
                        ROOT_CERT_FILE, SSLerrmessage())));
    }
    else
    {
-       /*
-        * Check the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) if file exists.
-        * http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid14_gci803160,
-        * 00.html
+       /*----------
+        * Load the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) if file exists.
+        * http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid14_gci803160,00.html
+        *----------
         */
        X509_STORE *cvstore = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(SSL_context);
 
@@ -837,7 +832,8 @@ initialize_SSL(void)
        {
            /* Set the flags to check against the complete CRL chain */
            if (X509_STORE_load_locations(cvstore, ROOT_CRL_FILE, NULL) == 1)
-/* OpenSSL 0.96 does not support X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK */
+           {
+               /* OpenSSL 0.96 does not support X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK */
 #ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
                X509_STORE_set_flags(cvstore,
                          X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK | X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
@@ -847,6 +843,7 @@ initialize_SSL(void)
                        ROOT_CRL_FILE),
                 errdetail("SSL library does not support certificate revocation lists.")));
 #endif
+           }
            else
            {
                /* Not fatal - we do not require CRL */
@@ -858,14 +855,15 @@ initialize_SSL(void)
 
            /*
             * Always ask for SSL client cert, but don't fail if it's not
-            * presented. We'll fail later in this case, based on what we find
-            * in pg_hba.conf.
+            * presented.  We might fail such connections later, depending on
+            * what we find in pg_hba.conf.
             */
            SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_context,
                               (SSL_VERIFY_PEER |
                                SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE),
                               verify_cb);
 
+           /* Set flag to remember CA store is successfully loaded */
            ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
        }