Remove initdb's rather gratuitous check to see if the backend created a

flat password file, because it never will anymore.  We had managed to
miss this during the recent flat-file-ectomy because it only happens if
--pwfile or --pwprompt is specified to initdb.  Apparently, few hackers
use those.  Reported by Erik Rijkers.

diff --git a/src/bin/initdb/initdb.c b/src/bin/initdb/initdb.c
index 3ea067190bb08e856d0a1c605395cc7c352f93e4..ae400004a224d68d24e45ccdd1cc39e0cbdba1ba 100644 (file)
--- a/src/bin/initdb/initdb.c
+++ b/src/bin/initdb/initdb.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
  * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
  * Portions taken from FreeBSD.
  *
- * $PostgreSQL: pgsql/src/bin/initdb/initdb.c,v 1.174 2009/09/02 02:40:52 tgl Exp $
+ * $PostgreSQL: pgsql/src/bin/initdb/initdb.c,v 1.175 2009/09/03 01:40:11 tgl Exp $
  *
  *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  */
@@ -1434,8 +1434,6 @@ get_set_pwd(void)
 
    char       *pwd1,
               *pwd2;
-   char        pwdpath[MAXPGPATH];
-   struct stat statbuf;
 
    if (pwprompt)
    {
@@ -1505,16 +1503,6 @@ get_set_pwd(void)
    PG_CMD_CLOSE;
 
    check_ok();
-
-   snprintf(pwdpath, sizeof(pwdpath), "%s/global/pg_auth", pg_data);
-   if (stat(pwdpath, &statbuf) != 0 || !S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode))
-   {
-       fprintf(stderr,
-               _("%s: The password file was not generated. "
-                 "Please report this problem.\n"),
-               progname);
-       exit_nicely();
-   }
 }
 
 /*