linkend="example-pg-hba.conf"> is shown in
linkend="example-pg-ident.conf">. In this example setup, anyone
- logged in to a machine on the 192.168 network that does not have
- the Unix user name bryanh, ann, or robert would not be granted access.
- Unix user robert would only be allowed access when he tries to
- connect as
PostgreSQL user bob,- not as robert
- or anyone else. ann would only be allowed to connect as
- ann. User bryanh would be allowed to connect as either
+ logged in to a machine on the 192.168 network that does not have the
+ Unix user name bryanh, ann, or
+ robert would not be granted access. Unix user
+ robert would only be allowed access when he tries to
+ connect as
PostgreSQL user bob, not+ as robert or anyone else. ann would
+ only be allowed to connect as ann. User
+ bryanh would be allowed to connect as either
bryanh himself or as guest1.
omicron bryanh bryanh
omicron ann ann
-# bob has username robert on these machines
+# bob has user name robert on these machines
omicron robert bob
# bryanh can also connect as guest1
omicron bryanh guest1
-No pg_hba.conf entry for host 123.123.123.123, user joeblow, database testdb
+No pg_hba.conf entry for host 123.123.123.123, user andym, database testdb
- This is what you are most likely to get if you succeed in
- contacting the server, but it does not want to talk to you. As the
- message suggests, the server refused the connection request
- because it found no authorizing entry in its pg_hba.conf
+ This is what you are most likely to get if you succeed in contacting
+ the server, but it does not want to talk to you. As the message
+ suggests, the server refused the connection request because it found
+ no authorizing entry in its pg_hba.conf
configuration file.
-Password authentication failed for user 'joeblow'
+Password authentication failed for user 'andym'
- Messages like this indicate that you contacted the server, and
- it is willing to talk to you, but not until you pass the
- authorization method specified in the
- pg_hba.conf file. Check the password you are
- providing, or check your Kerberos or ident software if the
- complaint mentions one of those authentication types.
+ Messages like this indicate that you contacted the server, and it is
+ willing to talk to you, but not until you pass the authorization
+ method specified in the pg_hba.conf file. Check
+ the password you are providing, or check your Kerberos or ident
+ software if the complaint mentions one of those authentication
+ types.
-FATAL 1: user "joeblow" does not exist
+FATAL 1: user "andym" does not exist
The indicated user name was not found.
- Note that the server log may contain more information
- about an authentication failure than is reported to the client.
- If you are confused about the reason for a failure, check the log.
+ Note that the server log may contain more information about an
+ authentication failure than is reported to the client. If you are
+ confused about the reason for a failure, check the log.
+++ /dev/null
-
-
-
-
- 2000-11-18
-
-
-
- 1
- Application
-
-
-
- pg_passwd
-
change a secondary PostgreSQL password file-
-
-
-
- pg_passwd
-
-
-
-
-
Description
-
pg_passwd is a tool for manipulating flat
- text password files. These files can control client authentication of
- the
PostgreSQL server. More information
- about setting up this authentication mechanism can be found in the
- Administrator's Guide.
-
-
- The format of a text password file is one entry per line; the fields
- of each entry are separated by colons. The first field is the user
- name, the second field is the encrypted password. Other fields are
- ignored (to allow password files to be shared between applications
- that use similar formats).
pg_passwd- enables users to interactively add entries to such a file, to alter
- passwords of existing entries, and to encrypt such passwords.
-
-
- Supply the name of the password file as argument to the
-
pg_passwd command. To be used by
- PostgreSQL, the file needs to be located in the server's data
- directory, and the base name of the file needs to be specified in the
- pg_hba.conf access control file.
-
-
-
$ pg_passwd /usr/local/pgsql/data/passwords-File "/usr/local/pgsql/data/passwords" does not exist. Create? (y/n): y
-
-
- where the Password: and Re-enter
- password: prompts require the same password input which
- is not displayed on the terminal. Note that the password is limited
- to eight useful characters by restrictions of the standard crypt(3)
- library routine.
-
-
- The original password file is renamed to
- passwords.bk.
-
-
- To make use of this password file, put a line like the following in
- pg_hba.conf:
-
-host mydb 133.65.96.250 255.255.255.255 password passwords
-
-
- which would allow access to database mydb from host 133.65.96.250 using
- the passwords listed in the passwords file (and
- only to the users listed in that file).
-
-
-
- It is also useful to have entries in a password file with empty
- password fields. (This is different from an empty password.) Such
- entries allow you to restrict users who can access the system. These
- entries cannot be managed by
pg_passwd,
- but you can edit password files manually.
-
-
-
-
-
-
See also
- PostgreSQL Administrator's Guide
-
-
-
-
-
&initlocation;
&ipcclean;
&pgCtl;
- &pgPasswd;
&postgres;
&postmaster;
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2001, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
*
- * $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/commands/user.c,v 1.94 2002/03/26 19:15:48 tgl Exp $
+ * $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/commands/user.c,v 1.95 2002/04/04 04:25:45 momjian Exp $
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#include
#include
#include
+#include
#include
#include "access/heapam.h"
#include "libpq/crypt.h"
#include "miscadmin.h"
#include "storage/pmsignal.h"
+#include "utils/acl.h"
#include "utils/array.h"
#include "utils/builtins.h"
#include "utils/fmgroids.h"
static void CheckPgUserAclNotNull(void);
-/*---------------------------------------------------------------------
- * write_password_file / update_pg_pwd
+
+
+/*
+ * fputs_quote
+ *
+ * Outputs string in quotes, with double-quotes duplicated.
+ * We could use quote_ident(), but that expects varlena.
+ */
+static void fputs_quote(char *str, FILE *fp)
+{
+ fputc('"', fp);
+ while (*str)
+ {
+ fputc(*str, fp);
+ if (*str == '"')
+ fputc('"', fp);
+ str++;
+ }
+ fputc('"', fp);
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * group_getfilename --- get full pathname of group file
+ *
+ * Note that result string is palloc'd, and should be freed by the caller.
+ */
+char *
+group_getfilename(void)
+{
+ int bufsize;
+ char *pfnam;
+
+ bufsize = strlen(DataDir) + strlen("/global/") +
+ strlen(USER_GROUP_FILE) + 1;
+ pfnam = (char *) palloc(bufsize);
+ snprintf(pfnam, bufsize, "%s/global/%s", DataDir, USER_GROUP_FILE);
+
+ return pfnam;
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * Get full pathname of password file.
+ * Note that result string is palloc'd, and should be freed by the caller.
+ */
+char *
+user_getfilename(void)
+{
+ int bufsize;
+ char *pfnam;
+
+ bufsize = strlen(DataDir) + strlen("/global/") +
+ strlen(PWD_FILE) + 1;
+ pfnam = (char *) palloc(bufsize);
+ snprintf(pfnam, bufsize, "%s/global/%s", DataDir, PWD_FILE);
+
+ return pfnam;
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * write_group_file for trigger update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group
+ */
+static void
+write_group_file(Relation urel, Relation grel)
+{
+ char *filename,
+ *tempname;
+ int bufsize;
+ FILE *fp;
+ mode_t oumask;
+ HeapScanDesc scan;
+ HeapTuple tuple;
+ TupleDesc dsc = RelationGetDescr(grel);
+
+ /*
+ * Create a temporary filename to be renamed later. This prevents the
+ * backend from clobbering the pg_group file while the postmaster might
+ * be reading from it.
+ */
+ filename = group_getfilename();
+ bufsize = strlen(filename) + 12;
+ tempname = (char *) palloc(bufsize);
+
+ snprintf(tempname, bufsize, "%s.%d", filename, MyProcPid);
+ oumask = umask((mode_t) 077);
+ fp = AllocateFile(tempname, "w");
+ umask(oumask);
+ if (fp == NULL)
+ elog(ERROR, "write_group_file: unable to write %s: %m", tempname);
+
+ /* read table */
+ scan = heap_beginscan(grel, false, SnapshotSelf, 0, NULL);
+ while (HeapTupleIsValid(tuple = heap_getnext(scan, 0)))
+ {
+ Datum datum, grolist_datum;
+ bool isnull;
+ char *groname;
+ IdList *grolist_p;
+ AclId *aidp;
+ int i, j,
+ num;
+ char *usename;
+ bool first_user = true;
+
+ datum = heap_getattr(tuple, Anum_pg_group_groname, dsc, &isnull);
+ if (isnull)
+ continue; /* ignore NULL groupnames */
+ groname = (char *) DatumGetName(datum);
+
+ grolist_datum = heap_getattr(tuple, Anum_pg_group_grolist, dsc, &isnull);
+ /* Ignore NULL group lists */
+ if (isnull)
+ continue;
+
+ grolist_p = DatumGetIdListP(grolist_datum);
+ /*
+ * Check for illegal characters in the group name.
+ */
+ i = strcspn(groname, "\n");
+ if (groname[i] != '\0')
+ {
+ elog(LOG, "Invalid group name '%s'", groname);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* be sure the IdList is not toasted */
+ /* scan it */
+ num = IDLIST_NUM(grolist_p);
+ aidp = IDLIST_DAT(grolist_p);
+ for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
+ {
+ tuple = SearchSysCache(SHADOWSYSID,
+ PointerGetDatum(aidp[i]),
+ 0, 0, 0);
+ if (HeapTupleIsValid(tuple))
+ {
+ usename = NameStr(((Form_pg_shadow) GETSTRUCT(tuple))->usename);
+
+ /*
+ * Check for illegal characters in the user name.
+ */
+ j = strcspn(usename, "\n");
+ if (usename[j] != '\0')
+ {
+ elog(LOG, "Invalid user name '%s'", usename);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* File format is:
+ * "dbname" "user1","user2","user3"
+ * This matches pg_hba.conf.
+ */
+ if (first_user)
+ {
+ fputs_quote(groname, fp);
+ fputs("\t", fp);
+ }
+ else
+ fputs(" ", fp);
+
+ first_user = false;
+ fputs_quote(usename, fp);
+
+ ReleaseSysCache(tuple);
+ }
+ }
+ if (!first_user)
+ fputs("\n", fp);
+ /* if IdList was toasted, free detoasted copy */
+ if ((Pointer) grolist_p != DatumGetPointer(grolist_datum))
+ pfree(grolist_p);
+ }
+ heap_endscan(scan);
+
+ fflush(fp);
+ if (ferror(fp))
+ elog(ERROR, "%s: %m", tempname);
+ FreeFile(fp);
+
+ /*
+ * Rename the temp file to its final name, deleting the old pg_pwd. We
+ * expect that rename(2) is an atomic action.
+ */
+ if (rename(tempname, filename))
+ elog(ERROR, "rename %s to %s: %m", tempname, filename);
+
+ pfree((void *) tempname);
+ pfree((void *) filename);
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * write_password_file for trigger update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group
*
* copy the modified contents of pg_shadow to a file used by the postmaster
* for user authentication. The file is stored as $PGDATA/global/pg_pwd.
* We raise an error to force transaction rollback if we detect an illegal
* username or password --- illegal being defined as values that would
* mess up the pg_pwd parser.
- *---------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
static void
-write_password_file(Relation rel)
+write_user_file(Relation urel)
{
char *filename,
*tempname;
mode_t oumask;
HeapScanDesc scan;
HeapTuple tuple;
- TupleDesc dsc = RelationGetDescr(rel);
+ TupleDesc dsc = RelationGetDescr(urel);
/*
* Create a temporary filename to be renamed later. This prevents the
* backend from clobbering the pg_pwd file while the postmaster might
* be reading from it.
*/
- filename = crypt_getpwdfilename();
+ filename = user_getfilename();
bufsize = strlen(filename) + 12;
tempname = (char *) palloc(bufsize);
elog(ERROR, "write_password_file: unable to write %s: %m", tempname);
/* read table */
- scan = heap_beginscan(rel, false, SnapshotSelf, 0, NULL);
+ scan = heap_beginscan(urel, false, SnapshotSelf, 0, NULL);
while (HeapTupleIsValid(tuple = heap_getnext(scan, 0)))
{
- Datum datum_n,
- datum_p,
- datum_v;
- bool null_n,
- null_p,
- null_v;
- char *str_n,
- *str_p,
- *str_v;
+ Datum datum;
+ bool isnull;
+ char *usename,
+ *passwd,
+ *valuntil;
int i;
- datum_n = heap_getattr(tuple, Anum_pg_shadow_usename, dsc, &null_n);
- if (null_n)
+ datum = heap_getattr(tuple, Anum_pg_shadow_usename, dsc, &isnull);
+ if (isnull)
continue; /* ignore NULL usernames */
- str_n = DatumGetCString(DirectFunctionCall1(nameout, datum_n));
+ usename = (char *) DatumGetName(datum);
- datum_p = heap_getattr(tuple, Anum_pg_shadow_passwd, dsc, &null_p);
+ datum = heap_getattr(tuple, Anum_pg_shadow_passwd, dsc, &isnull);
/*
* It can be argued that people having a null password shouldn't
* assuming an empty password in that case is better, change this
* logic to look something like the code for valuntil.
*/
- if (null_p)
- {
- pfree(str_n);
+ if (isnull)
continue;
- }
- str_p = DatumGetCString(DirectFunctionCall1(textout, datum_p));
- datum_v = heap_getattr(tuple, Anum_pg_shadow_valuntil, dsc, &null_v);
- if (null_v)
- str_v = pstrdup("\\N");
+ passwd = DatumGetCString(DirectFunctionCall1(textout, datum));
+
+ datum = heap_getattr(tuple, Anum_pg_shadow_valuntil, dsc, &isnull);
+ if (isnull)
+ valuntil = pstrdup("");
else
- str_v = DatumGetCString(DirectFunctionCall1(nabstimeout, datum_v));
+ valuntil = DatumGetCString(DirectFunctionCall1(nabstimeout, datum));
/*
* Check for illegal characters in the username and password.
*/
- i = strcspn(str_n, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR "\n");
- if (str_n[i] != '\0')
- elog(ERROR, "Invalid user name '%s'", str_n);
- i = strcspn(str_p, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR "\n");
- if (str_p[i] != '\0')
- elog(ERROR, "Invalid user password '%s'", str_p);
+ i = strcspn(usename, "\n");
+ if (usename[i] != '\0')
+ elog(ERROR, "Invalid user name '%s'", usename);
+ i = strcspn(passwd, "\n");
+ if (passwd[i] != '\0')
+ elog(ERROR, "Invalid user password '%s'", passwd);
/*
* The extra columns we emit here are not really necessary. To
* remove them, the parser in backend/libpq/crypt.c would need to
* be adjusted.
*/
- fprintf(fp,
- "%s"
- CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR
- "0"
- CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR
- "x"
- CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR
- "x"
- CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR
- "x"
- CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR
- "x"
- CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR
- "%s"
- CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR
- "%s\n",
- str_n,
- str_p,
- str_v);
-
- pfree(str_n);
- pfree(str_p);
- pfree(str_v);
+ fputs_quote(usename, fp);
+ fputs(" ", fp);
+ fputs_quote(passwd, fp);
+ fputs(" ", fp);
+ fputs_quote(valuntil, fp);
+
+ pfree(passwd);
+ pfree(valuntil);
}
heap_endscan(scan);
pfree((void *) tempname);
pfree((void *) filename);
-
- /*
- * Signal the postmaster to reload its password-file cache.
- */
- SendPostmasterSignal(PMSIGNAL_PASSWORD_CHANGE);
}
/* This is the wrapper for triggers. */
Datum
-update_pg_pwd(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
/*
* ExclusiveLock ensures no one modifies pg_shadow while we read it,
* and that only one backend rewrites the flat file at a time. It's
* OK to allow normal reads of pg_shadow in parallel, however.
*/
- Relation rel = heap_openr(ShadowRelationName, ExclusiveLock);
+ Relation urel = heap_openr(ShadowRelationName, ExclusiveLock);
+ Relation grel = heap_openr(GroupRelationName, ExclusiveLock);
- write_password_file(rel);
+ write_user_file(urel);
+ write_group_file(urel, grel);
/* OK to release lock, since we did not modify the relation */
- heap_close(rel, ExclusiveLock);
+ heap_close(grel, ExclusiveLock);
+ heap_close(urel, ExclusiveLock);
+
+ /*
+ * Signal the postmaster to reload its password & group-file cache.
+ */
+ SendPostmasterSignal(PMSIGNAL_PASSWORD_CHANGE);
+
return PointerGetDatum(NULL);
}
}
/*
- * Write the updated pg_shadow data to the flat password file.
+ * Now we can clean up; but keep lock until commit.
*/
- write_password_file(pg_shadow_rel);
+ heap_close(pg_shadow_rel, NoLock);
/*
- * Now we can clean up; but keep lock until commit.
+ * Write the updated pg_shadow and pg_group data to the flat file.
*/
- heap_close(pg_shadow_rel, NoLock);
+ update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group(NULL);
}
heap_freetuple(new_tuple);
/*
- * Write the updated pg_shadow data to the flat password file.
+ * Now we can clean up.
*/
- write_password_file(pg_shadow_rel);
+ heap_close(pg_shadow_rel, NoLock);
/*
- * Now we can clean up.
+ * Write the updated pg_shadow and pg_group data to the flat file.
*/
- heap_close(pg_shadow_rel, NoLock);
+ update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group(NULL);
}
{
Datum datum;
bool isnull;
- ArrayType *a;
+ ArrayType *array;
repl_null[Anum_pg_shadow_useconfig-1] = ' ';
Anum_pg_shadow_useconfig, &isnull);
if (valuestr)
- a = GUCArrayAdd(isnull
+ array = GUCArrayAdd(isnull
? NULL
: (ArrayType *) pg_detoast_datum((struct varlena *)datum),
stmt->variable, valuestr);
else
- a = GUCArrayDelete(isnull
+ array = GUCArrayDelete(isnull
? NULL
: (ArrayType *) pg_detoast_datum((struct varlena *)datum),
stmt->variable);
- repl_val[Anum_pg_shadow_useconfig-1] = PointerGetDatum(a);
+ repl_val[Anum_pg_shadow_useconfig-1] = PointerGetDatum(array);
}
newtuple = heap_modifytuple(oldtuple, rel, repl_val, repl_null, repl_repl);
datum = heap_getattr(tmp_tuple, Anum_pg_database_datname,
pg_dsc, &null);
Assert(!null);
- dbname = DatumGetCString(DirectFunctionCall1(nameout, datum));
+ dbname = (char *) DatumGetName(datum);
elog(ERROR, "DROP USER: user \"%s\" owns database \"%s\", cannot be removed%s",
user, dbname,
(length(stmt->users) > 1) ? " (no users removed)" : "");
}
/*
- * Write the updated pg_shadow data to the flat password file.
+ * Now we can clean up.
*/
- write_password_file(pg_shadow_rel);
+ heap_close(pg_shadow_rel, NoLock);
/*
- * Now we can clean up.
+ * Write the updated pg_shadow and pg_group data to the flat file.
*/
- heap_close(pg_shadow_rel, NoLock);
+ update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group(NULL);
}
}
heap_close(pg_group_rel, NoLock);
+
+ /*
+ * Write the updated pg_shadow and pg_group data to the flat file.
+ */
+ update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group(NULL);
}
ReleaseSysCache(group_tuple);
+ /*
+ * Write the updated pg_shadow and pg_group data to the flat files.
+ */
heap_close(pg_group_rel, NoLock);
+
+ /*
+ * Write the updated pg_shadow and pg_group data to the flat file.
+ */
+ update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group(NULL);
}
elog(ERROR, "DROP GROUP: group \"%s\" does not exist", stmt->name);
heap_close(pg_group_rel, NoLock);
+
+ /*
+ * Write the updated pg_shadow and pg_group data to the flat file.
+ */
+ update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group(NULL);
}
# Makefile for libpq subsystem (backend half of libpq interface)
#
# IDENTIFICATION
-# $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/libpq/Makefile,v 1.29 2002/03/04 01:46:02 tgl Exp $
+# $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/libpq/Makefile,v 1.30 2002/04/04 04:25:46 momjian Exp $
#
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------
# be-fsstubs is here for historical reasons, probably belongs elsewhere
-OBJS = be-fsstubs.o \
- auth.o crypt.o hba.o md5.o password.o \
- pqcomm.o pqformat.o pqsignal.o
+OBJS = be-fsstubs.o auth.o crypt.o hba.o md5.o pqcomm.o pqformat.o pqsignal.o
all: SUBSYS.o
*
*
* IDENTIFICATION
- * $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/libpq/auth.c,v 1.79 2002/03/05 07:57:45 momjian Exp $
+ * $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/libpq/auth.c,v 1.80 2002/04/04 04:25:47 momjian Exp $
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#include "miscadmin.h"
static void sendAuthRequest(Port *port, AuthRequest areq);
-static int checkPassword(Port *port, char *user, char *password);
static int old_be_recvauth(Port *port);
static int map_old_to_new(Port *port, UserAuth old, int status);
static void auth_failed(Port *port, int status);
saved = port->auth_method;
port->auth_method = uaPassword;
- status = checkPassword(port, user, password);
+ status = md5_crypt_verify(port, user, password);
port->auth_method = saved;
initStringInfo(&buf);
pq_getstr(&buf);
-
+
/* Do not echo failed password to logs, for security. */
elog(DEBUG5, "received PAM packet");
/* Do not echo failed password to logs, for security. */
elog(DEBUG5, "received password packet");
- result = checkPassword(port, port->user, buf.data);
+ result = md5_crypt_verify(port, port->user, buf.data);
+
pfree(buf.data);
return result;
}
-/*
- * Handle `password' and `crypt' records. If an auth argument was
- * specified, use the respective file. Else use pg_shadow passwords.
- */
-static int
-checkPassword(Port *port, char *user, char *password)
-{
- if (port->auth_arg[0] != '\0')
- return verify_password(port, user, password);
-
- return md5_crypt_verify(port, user, password);
-}
-
-
/*
* Server demux routine for incoming authentication information for protocol
* version 0.
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2001, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
*
- * $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/libpq/crypt.c,v 1.44 2002/03/04 01:46:03 tgl Exp $
+ * $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/libpq/crypt.c,v 1.45 2002/04/04 04:25:47 momjian Exp $
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#include "postgres.h"
-#include
#include
#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
#include
#include "libpq/libpq.h"
#include "miscadmin.h"
#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
#include "utils/nabstime.h"
-#define CRYPT_PWD_FILE "pg_pwd"
-
-
-static char **pwd_cache = NULL;
-static int pwd_cache_count = 0;
-
-/*
- * crypt_getpwdfilename --- get full pathname of password file
- *
- * Note that result string is palloc'd, and should be freed by the caller.
- */
-char *
-crypt_getpwdfilename(void)
-{
- int bufsize;
- char *pfnam;
-
- bufsize = strlen(DataDir) + 8 + strlen(CRYPT_PWD_FILE) + 1;
- pfnam = (char *) palloc(bufsize);
- snprintf(pfnam, bufsize, "%s/global/%s", DataDir, CRYPT_PWD_FILE);
-
- return pfnam;
-}
-
-/*
- * Open the password file if possible (return NULL if not)
- */
-static FILE *
-crypt_openpwdfile(void)
-{
- char *filename;
- FILE *pwdfile;
-
- filename = crypt_getpwdfilename();
- pwdfile = AllocateFile(filename, "r");
-
- if (pwdfile == NULL && errno != ENOENT)
- elog(LOG, "could not open %s: %m", filename);
-
- pfree(filename);
-
- return pwdfile;
-}
-
-/*
- * Compare two password-file lines on the basis of their usernames.
- *
- * Can also be used to compare just a username against a password-file
- * line (for bsearch).
- */
-static int
-compar_user(const void *user_a, const void *user_b)
-{
- char *login_a;
- char *login_b;
- int len_a,
- len_b,
- result;
-
- login_a = *((char **) user_a);
- login_b = *((char **) user_b);
-
- /*
- * We only really want to compare the user logins which are first and
- * are terminated by CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR. (NB: this code
- * effectively assumes that CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR is just one char.)
- */
- len_a = strcspn(login_a, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR);
- len_b = strcspn(login_b, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR);
-
- result = strncmp(login_a, login_b, Min(len_a, len_b));
-
- if (result == 0) /* one could be a prefix of the other */
- result = (len_a - len_b);
-
- return result;
-}
-
-/*
- * Load or reload the password-file cache
- */
-void
-load_password_cache(void)
-{
- FILE *pwd_file;
- char buffer[1024];
-
- /*
- * If for some reason we fail to open the password file, preserve the
- * old cache contents; this seems better than dropping the cache if,
- * say, we are temporarily out of filetable slots.
- */
- if (!(pwd_file = crypt_openpwdfile()))
- return;
-
- /* free any old data */
- if (pwd_cache)
- {
- while (--pwd_cache_count >= 0)
- pfree(pwd_cache[pwd_cache_count]);
- pfree(pwd_cache);
- pwd_cache = NULL;
- pwd_cache_count = 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * Read the file and store its lines in current memory context, which
- * we expect will be PostmasterContext. That context will live as
- * long as we need the cache to live, ie, until just after each
- * postmaster child has completed client authentication.
- */
- while (fgets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), pwd_file) != NULL)
- {
- int blen;
-
- /*
- * We must remove the return char at the end of the string, as
- * this will affect the correct parsing of the password entry.
- */
- if (buffer[(blen = strlen(buffer) - 1)] == '\n')
- buffer[blen] = '\0';
-
- if (pwd_cache == NULL)
- pwd_cache = (char **)
- palloc(sizeof(char *) * (pwd_cache_count + 1));
- else
- pwd_cache = (char **)
- repalloc((void *) pwd_cache,
- sizeof(char *) * (pwd_cache_count + 1));
- pwd_cache[pwd_cache_count++] = pstrdup(buffer);
- }
-
- FreeFile(pwd_file);
-
- /*
- * Now sort the entries in the cache for faster searching later.
- */
- qsort((void *) pwd_cache, pwd_cache_count, sizeof(char *), compar_user);
-}
-
-/*
- * Parse a line of the password file to extract password and valid-until date.
- */
-static bool
-crypt_parsepwdentry(char *buffer, char **pwd, char **valdate)
-{
- char *parse = buffer;
- int count,
- i;
-
- *pwd = NULL;
- *valdate = NULL;
-
- /*
- * skip to the password field
- */
- for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
- {
- parse += strcspn(parse, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR);
- if (*parse == '\0')
- return false;
- parse++;
- }
-
- /*
- * store a copy of user password to return
- */
- count = strcspn(parse, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR);
- *pwd = (char *) palloc(count + 1);
- memcpy(*pwd, parse, count);
- (*pwd)[count] = '\0';
- parse += count;
- if (*parse == '\0')
- {
- pfree(*pwd);
- *pwd = NULL;
- return false;
- }
- parse++;
-
- /*
- * store a copy of the date login becomes invalid
- */
- count = strcspn(parse, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR);
- *valdate = (char *) palloc(count + 1);
- memcpy(*valdate, parse, count);
- (*valdate)[count] = '\0';
-
- return true;
-}
-
-/*
- * Lookup a username in the password-file cache,
- * return his password and valid-until date.
- */
-static bool
-crypt_getloginfo(const char *user, char **passwd, char **valuntil)
-{
- *passwd = NULL;
- *valuntil = NULL;
-
- if (pwd_cache)
- {
- char **pwd_entry;
-
- pwd_entry = (char **) bsearch((void *) &user,
- (void *) pwd_cache,
- pwd_cache_count,
- sizeof(char *),
- compar_user);
- if (pwd_entry)
- {
- if (crypt_parsepwdentry(*pwd_entry, passwd, valuntil))
- return true;
- }
- }
-
- return false;
-}
-
-/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
-
int
md5_crypt_verify(const Port *port, const char *user, const char *pgpass)
{
*valuntil,
*crypt_pwd;
int retval = STATUS_ERROR;
+ List **line;
- if (!crypt_getloginfo(user, &passwd, &valuntil))
+ if ((line = get_user_line(user)) == NULL)
return STATUS_ERROR;
+ passwd = lfirst(lnext(lnext(*line)));
+ valuntil = lfirst(lnext(lnext(lnext(*line))));
+
if (passwd == NULL || *passwd == '\0')
{
if (passwd)
*
*
* IDENTIFICATION
- * $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/libpq/hba.c,v 1.80 2002/03/04 01:46:03 tgl Exp $
+ * $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/libpq/hba.c,v 1.81 2002/04/04 04:25:47 momjian Exp $
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#include
+#include "commands/user.h"
+#include "libpq/crypt.h"
#include "libpq/libpq.h"
#include "miscadmin.h"
#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
#include "storage/fd.h"
-#define MAX_TOKEN 80
-/* Maximum size of one token in the configuration file */
-
#define IDENT_USERNAME_MAX 512
/* Max size of username ident server can return */
+/* This is used to separate values in multi-valued column strings */
+#define MULTI_VALUE_SEP "\001"
+
/*
* These variables hold the pre-parsed contents of the hba and ident
* configuration files. Each is a list of sublists, one sublist for
*/
static List *hba_lines = NIL; /* pre-parsed contents of hba file */
static List *ident_lines = NIL; /* pre-parsed contents of ident file */
+static List *group_lines = NIL; /* pre-parsed contents of group file */
+static List *user_lines = NIL; /* pre-parsed contents of user password file */
+
+/* sorted entries so we can do binary search lookups */
+static List **user_sorted = NULL; /* sorted user list, for bsearch() */
+static List **group_sorted = NULL; /* sorted group list, for bsearch() */
+static int user_length;
+static int group_length;
+static List *tokenize_file(FILE *file);
+static char *tokenize_inc_file(const char *inc_filename);
/*
* Some standard C libraries, including GNU, have an isblank() function.
/*
- * Grab one token out of fp. Tokens are strings of non-blank
- * characters bounded by blank characters, beginning of line, and end
- * of line. Blank means space or tab. Return the token as *buf.
- * Leave file positioned to character immediately after the token or
- * EOF, whichever comes first. If no more tokens on line, return null
- * string as *buf and position file to beginning of next line or EOF,
- * whichever comes first.
+ * Grab one token out of fp. Tokens are strings of non-blank
+ * characters bounded by blank characters, beginning of line, and
+ * end of line. Blank means space or tab. Return the token as
+ * *buf. Leave file positioned to character immediately after the
+ * token or EOF, whichever comes first. If no more tokens on line,
+ * return null string as *buf and position file to beginning of
+ * next line or EOF, whichever comes first. Allow spaces in quoted
+ * strings. Terminate on unquoted commas. Handle comments.
*/
-static void
+void
next_token(FILE *fp, char *buf, const int bufsz)
{
int c;
- char *eb = buf + (bufsz - 1);
+ char *end_buf = buf + (bufsz - 1);
+ bool in_quote = false;
+ bool was_quote = false;
- /* Move over initial token-delimiting blanks */
- while ((c = getc(fp)) != EOF && isblank(c))
+ /* Move over initial whitespace and commas */
+ while ((c = getc(fp)) != EOF && (isblank(c) || c == ','))
;
if (c != EOF && c != '\n')
{
/*
- * build a token in buf of next characters up to EOF, eol, or
- * blank. If the token gets too long, we still parse it
- * correctly, but the excess characters are not stored into *buf.
+ * Build a token in buf of next characters up to EOF, EOL, unquoted
+ * comma, or unquoted whitespace.
*/
- while (c != EOF && c != '\n' && !isblank(c))
+ while (c != EOF && c != '\n' &&
+ (!isblank(c) || in_quote == true))
{
- if (buf < eb)
+ if (c == '"')
+ in_quote = !in_quote;
+
+ /* skip comments to EOL */
+ if (c == '#' && !in_quote)
+ {
+ while ((c = getc(fp)) != EOF && c != '\n')
+ ;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (buf >= end_buf)
+ {
+ elog(LOG, "Token too long in authentication file, skipping, %s", buf);
+ /* Discard remainder of line */
+ while ((c = getc(fp)) != EOF && c != '\n')
+ ;
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (c != '"' || (c == '"' && was_quote))
*buf++ = c;
+
+ /* We pass back the comma so the caller knows there is more */
+ if ((isblank(c) || c == ',') && !in_quote)
+ break;
+
+ /* Literal double-quote is two double-quotes */
+ if (c == '"')
+ was_quote = !was_quote;
+ else
+ was_quote = false;
+
c = getc(fp);
}
/*
* Put back the char right after the token (critical in case it is
- * eol, since we need to detect end-of-line at next call).
+ * EOL, since we need to detect end-of-line at next call).
*/
if (c != EOF)
ungetc(c, fp);
*buf = '\0';
}
+/*
+ * Tokenize file and handle file inclusion and comma lists. We have
+ * to break apart the commas to expand any file names then
+ * reconstruct with commas.
+ */
+static char *
+next_token_expand(FILE *file)
+{
+ char buf[MAX_TOKEN];
+ char *comma_str = pstrdup("");
+ bool trailing_comma;
+ char *incbuf;
+
+ do
+ {
+ next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (!*buf)
+ break;
+
+ if (buf[strlen(buf)-1] == ',')
+ {
+ trailing_comma = true;
+ buf[strlen(buf)-1] = '\0';
+ }
+ else
+ trailing_comma = false;
+
+ /* Is this referencing a file? */
+ if (buf[0] == '@')
+ incbuf = tokenize_inc_file(buf+1);
+ else
+ incbuf = pstrdup(buf);
+
+ comma_str = repalloc(comma_str,
+ strlen(comma_str) + strlen(incbuf) + 1);
+ strcat(comma_str, incbuf);
+ pfree(incbuf);
+
+ if (trailing_comma)
+ {
+ comma_str = repalloc(comma_str, strlen(comma_str) + 1 + 1);
+ strcat(comma_str, MULTI_VALUE_SEP);
+ }
+ } while (trailing_comma);
+
+ return comma_str;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free memory used by lines/tokens (i.e., structure built by tokenize_file)
+ */
static void
-read_through_eol(FILE *file)
+free_lines(List **lines)
{
- int c;
+ if (*lines)
+ {
+ List *line,
+ *token;
- while ((c = getc(file)) != EOF && c != '\n')
- ;
+ foreach(line, *lines)
+ {
+ List *ln = lfirst(line);
+
+ /* free the pstrdup'd tokens (don't try it on the line number) */
+ foreach(token, lnext(ln))
+ pfree(lfirst(token));
+ /* free the sublist structure itself */
+ freeList(ln);
+ }
+ /* free the list structure itself */
+ freeList(*lines);
+ /* clear the static variable */
+ *lines = NIL;
+ }
+}
+
+
+static char *
+tokenize_inc_file(const char *inc_filename)
+{
+ char *inc_fullname;
+ FILE *inc_file;
+ List *inc_lines;
+ List *line;
+ char *comma_str = pstrdup("");
+
+ inc_fullname = (char *) palloc(strlen(DataDir) + 1 +
+ strlen(inc_filename) + 1);
+ strcpy(inc_fullname, DataDir);
+ strcat(inc_fullname, "/");
+ strcat(inc_fullname, inc_filename);
+
+ inc_file = AllocateFile(inc_fullname, "r");
+ if (!inc_file)
+ {
+ elog(LOG, "tokenize_inc_file: Unable to open secondary authentication file \"@%s\" as \"%s\": %m",
+ inc_filename, inc_fullname);
+ pfree(inc_fullname);
+
+ /* return empty string, it matches nothing */
+ return pstrdup("");
+ }
+ pfree(inc_fullname);
+
+ /* There is possible recursion here if the file contains @ */
+ inc_lines = tokenize_file(inc_file);
+ FreeFile(inc_file);
+
+ /* Create comma-separate string from List */
+ foreach(line, inc_lines)
+ {
+ List *ln = lfirst(line);
+ List *token;
+
+ /* First entry is line number */
+ foreach(token, lnext(ln))
+ {
+ if (strlen(comma_str))
+ {
+ comma_str = repalloc(comma_str, strlen(comma_str) + 1);
+ strcat(comma_str, MULTI_VALUE_SEP);
+ }
+ comma_str = repalloc(comma_str,
+ strlen(comma_str) + strlen(lfirst(token)) + 1);
+ strcat(comma_str, lfirst(token));
+ }
+ }
+
+ free_lines(&inc_lines);
+
+ return comma_str;
}
+
/*
* Read the given file and create a list of line sublists.
*/
List *lines = NIL;
List *next_line = NIL;
int line_number = 1;
- char buf[MAX_TOKEN];
- char *comment_ptr;
+ char *buf;
while (!feof(file))
{
- next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
-
- /* trim off comment, even if inside a token */
- comment_ptr = strchr(buf, '#');
- if (comment_ptr != NULL)
- *comment_ptr = '\0';
+ buf = next_token_expand(file);
- /* add token to list, unless we are at eol or comment start */
+ /* add token to list, unless we are at EOL or comment start */
if (buf[0] != '\0')
{
if (next_line == NIL)
lines = lappend(lines, next_line);
}
/* append token to current line's list */
- next_line = lappend(next_line, pstrdup(buf));
+ next_line = lappend(next_line, buf);
}
else
{
- /* we are at real or logical eol, so force a new line List */
+ /* we are at real or logical EOL, so force a new line List */
next_line = NIL;
}
- if (comment_ptr != NULL)
- {
- /* Found a comment, so skip the rest of the line */
- read_through_eol(file);
- next_line = NIL;
- }
-
- /* Advance line number whenever we reach eol */
+ /* Advance line number whenever we reach EOL */
if (next_line == NIL)
line_number++;
}
/*
- * Free memory used by lines/tokens (ie, structure built by tokenize_file)
+ * Compare two password-file lines on the basis of their user names.
+ *
+ * Used for qsort() sorting and bsearch() lookup.
*/
-static void
-free_lines(List **lines)
+static int
+user_group_cmp(const void *user, const void *list)
{
- if (*lines)
+ /* first node is line number */
+ char *user1 = (char *)user;
+ char *user2 = lfirst(lnext(*(List **)list));
+
+ return strcmp(user1, user2);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Lookup a group name in the pg_group file
+ */
+static List **
+get_group_line(const char *group)
+{
+ return (List **) bsearch((void *) group,
+ (void *) group_sorted,
+ group_length,
+ sizeof(List *),
+ user_group_cmp);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Lookup a user name in the pg_shadow file
+ */
+List **
+get_user_line(const char *user)
+{
+ return (List **) bsearch((void *) user,
+ (void *) user_sorted,
+ user_length,
+ sizeof(List *),
+ user_group_cmp);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Check group for a specific user.
+ */
+static int
+check_group(char *group, char *user)
+{
+ List **line, *l;
+
+ if ((line = get_group_line(group)) != NULL)
{
- List *line,
- *token;
+ foreach(l, lnext(lnext(*line)))
+ if (strcmp(lfirst(l), user) == 0)
+ return 1;
+ }
- foreach(line, *lines)
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check comma user list for a specific user, handle group names.
+ */
+static int
+check_user(char *user, char *param_str)
+{
+ char *tok;
+
+ for (tok = strtok(param_str, MULTI_VALUE_SEP); tok != NULL; tok = strtok(NULL, MULTI_VALUE_SEP))
+ {
+ if (tok[0] == '+')
{
- List *ln = lfirst(line);
+ if (check_group(tok+1, user))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(tok, user) == 0 ||
+ strcmp(tok, "all") == 0)
+ return 1;
+ }
- /* free the pstrdup'd tokens (don't try it on the line number) */
- foreach(token, lnext(ln))
- pfree(lfirst(token));
- /* free the sublist structure itself */
- freeList(ln);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check to see if db/user combination matches param string.
+ */
+static int
+check_db(char *dbname, char *user, char *param_str)
+{
+ char *tok;
+
+ for (tok = strtok(param_str, MULTI_VALUE_SEP); tok != NULL; tok = strtok(NULL, MULTI_VALUE_SEP))
+ {
+ if (strcmp(tok, "all") == 0)
+ return 1;
+ else if (strcmp(tok, "sameuser") == 0)
+ {
+ if (strcmp(dbname, user) == 0)
+ return 1;
}
- /* free the list structure itself */
- freeList(*lines);
- /* clear the static variable */
- *lines = NIL;
+ else if (strcmp(tok, "samegroup") == 0)
+ {
+ if (check_group(dbname, user))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(tok, dbname) == 0)
+ return 1;
}
+ return 0;
}
int line_number;
char *token;
char *db;
+ char *user;
Assert(line != NIL);
line_number = lfirsti(line);
goto hba_syntax;
db = lfirst(line);
- /* Read the rest of the line. */
+ /* Get the user. */
+ line = lnext(line);
+ if (!line)
+ goto hba_syntax;
+ user = lfirst(line);
+
line = lnext(line);
if (!line)
goto hba_syntax;
+
+ /* Read the rest of the line. */
parse_hba_auth(line, &port->auth_method, port->auth_arg, error_p);
if (*error_p)
goto hba_syntax;
port->auth_method == uaKrb5)
goto hba_syntax;
- /*
- * If this record doesn't match the parameters of the connection
- * attempt, ignore it.
- */
- if ((strcmp(db, port->database) != 0 &&
- strcmp(db, "all") != 0 &&
- (strcmp(db, "sameuser") != 0 ||
- strcmp(port->database, port->user) != 0)) ||
- port->raddr.sa.sa_family != AF_UNIX)
+ if (port->raddr.sa.sa_family != AF_UNIX)
return;
}
else if (strcmp(token, "host") == 0 || strcmp(token, "hostssl") == 0)
goto hba_syntax;
db = lfirst(line);
+ /* Get the user. */
+ line = lnext(line);
+ if (!line)
+ goto hba_syntax;
+ user = lfirst(line);
+
/* Read the IP address field. */
line = lnext(line);
if (!line)
if (*error_p)
goto hba_syntax;
- /*
- * If this record doesn't match the parameters of the connection
- * attempt, ignore it.
- */
- if ((strcmp(db, port->database) != 0 &&
- strcmp(db, "all") != 0 &&
- (strcmp(db, "sameuser") != 0 ||
- strcmp(port->database, port->user) != 0)) ||
- port->raddr.sa.sa_family != AF_INET ||
+ /* Must meet network restrictions */
+ if (port->raddr.sa.sa_family != AF_INET ||
((file_ip_addr.s_addr ^ port->raddr.in.sin_addr.s_addr) & mask.s_addr) != 0)
return;
}
else
goto hba_syntax;
+ if (!check_db(port->database, port->user, db))
+ return;
+ if (!check_user(port->user, user))
+ return;
+
/* Success */
*found_p = true;
return;
}
+
+/*
+ * Open the group file if possible (return NULL if not)
+ */
+static FILE *
+group_openfile(void)
+{
+ char *filename;
+ FILE *groupfile;
+
+ filename = group_getfilename();
+ groupfile = AllocateFile(filename, "r");
+
+ if (groupfile == NULL && errno != ENOENT)
+ elog(LOG, "could not open %s: %m", filename);
+
+ pfree(filename);
+
+ return groupfile;
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * Open the password file if possible (return NULL if not)
+ */
+static FILE *
+user_openfile(void)
+{
+ char *filename;
+ FILE *pwdfile;
+
+ filename = user_getfilename();
+ pwdfile = AllocateFile(filename, "r");
+
+ if (pwdfile == NULL && errno != ENOENT)
+ elog(LOG, "could not open %s: %m", filename);
+
+ pfree(filename);
+
+ return pwdfile;
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * Load group/user name mapping file
+ */
+void
+load_group()
+{
+ FILE *group_file;
+ List *line;
+
+ if (group_lines)
+ free_lines(&group_lines);
+
+ group_file = group_openfile();
+ if (!group_file)
+ return;
+ group_lines = tokenize_file(group_file);
+ FreeFile(group_file);
+
+ /* create sorted lines for binary searching */
+ if (group_sorted)
+ pfree(group_sorted);
+ group_length = length(group_lines);
+ if (group_length)
+ {
+ int i = 0;
+
+ group_sorted = palloc(group_length * sizeof(List *));
+
+ foreach(line, group_lines)
+ group_sorted[i++] = lfirst(line);
+
+ qsort((void *) group_sorted, group_length, sizeof(List *), user_group_cmp);
+ }
+ else
+ group_sorted = NULL;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Load user/password mapping file
+ */
+void
+load_user()
+{
+ FILE *user_file;
+ List *line;
+
+ if (user_lines)
+ free_lines(&user_lines);
+
+ user_file = user_openfile();
+ if (!user_file)
+ return;
+ user_lines = tokenize_file(user_file);
+ FreeFile(user_file);
+
+ /* create sorted lines for binary searching */
+ if (user_sorted)
+ pfree(user_sorted);
+ user_length = length(user_lines);
+ if (user_length)
+ {
+ int i = 0;
+
+ user_sorted = palloc(user_length * sizeof(List *));
+
+ foreach(line, user_lines)
+ user_sorted[i++] = lfirst(line);
+
+ qsort((void *) user_sorted, user_length, sizeof(List *), user_group_cmp);
+ }
+ else
+ user_sorted = NULL;
+}
+
+
/*
* Read the config file and create a List of Lists of tokens in the file.
* If we find a file by the old name of the config file (pg_hba), we issue
* follow directions and just installed his old hba file in the new database
* system.
*/
-static void
+void
load_hba(void)
{
- int fd,
- bufsize;
+ int bufsize;
FILE *file; /* The config file we have to read */
- char *old_conf_file;
+ char *conf_file; /* The name of the config file */
if (hba_lines)
free_lines(&hba_lines);
- /*
- * The name of old config file that better not exist. Fail if config
- * file by old name exists. Put together the full pathname to the old
- * config file.
- */
- bufsize = (strlen(DataDir) + strlen(OLD_CONF_FILE) + 2) * sizeof(char);
- old_conf_file = (char *) palloc(bufsize);
- snprintf(old_conf_file, bufsize, "%s/%s", DataDir, OLD_CONF_FILE);
+ /* Put together the full pathname to the config file. */
+ bufsize = (strlen(DataDir) + strlen(CONF_FILE) + 2) * sizeof(char);
+ conf_file = (char *) palloc(bufsize);
+ snprintf(conf_file, bufsize, "%s/%s", DataDir, CONF_FILE);
- if ((fd = open(old_conf_file, O_RDONLY | PG_BINARY, 0)) != -1)
+ file = AllocateFile(conf_file, "r");
+ if (file == NULL)
{
- /* Old config file exists. Tell this guy he needs to upgrade. */
- close(fd);
- elog(LOG, "A file exists by the name used for host-based authentication "
- "in prior releases of Postgres (%s). The name and format of "
- "the configuration file have changed, so this file should be "
- "converted.", old_conf_file);
+ /* The open of the config file failed. */
+ elog(LOG, "load_hba: Unable to open authentication config file \"%s\": %m",
+ conf_file);
+ pfree(conf_file);
}
else
{
- char *conf_file; /* The name of the config file we have to
- * read */
-
- /* put together the full pathname to the config file */
- bufsize = (strlen(DataDir) + strlen(CONF_FILE) + 2) * sizeof(char);
- conf_file = (char *) palloc(bufsize);
- snprintf(conf_file, bufsize, "%s/%s", DataDir, CONF_FILE);
-
- file = AllocateFile(conf_file, "r");
- if (file == NULL)
- {
- /* The open of the config file failed. */
- elog(LOG, "load_hba: Unable to open authentication config file \"%s\": %m",
- conf_file);
- }
- else
- {
- hba_lines = tokenize_file(file);
- FreeFile(file);
- }
- pfree(conf_file);
+ hba_lines = tokenize_file(file);
+ FreeFile(file);
}
- pfree(old_conf_file);
+ pfree(conf_file);
}
/*
* Read the ident config file and create a List of Lists of tokens in the file.
*/
-static void
+void
load_ident(void)
{
FILE *file; /* The map file we have to read */
map_file = (char *) palloc(bufsize);
snprintf(map_file, bufsize, "%s/%s", DataDir, USERMAP_FILE);
- file = AllocateFile(map_file, PG_BINARY_R);
+ file = AllocateFile(map_file, "r");
if (file == NULL)
{
/* The open of the map file failed. */
/*
* Parse the string "*ident_response" as a response from a query to an Ident
- * server. If it's a normal response indicating a username, return true
- * and store the username at *ident_user. If it's anything else,
+ * server. If it's a normal response indicating a user name, return true
+ * and store the user name at *ident_user. If it's anything else,
* return false.
*/
static bool
cursor++; /* Go over colon */
while (isblank(*cursor))
cursor++; /* skip blanks */
- /* Rest of line is username. Copy it over. */
+ /* Rest of line is user name. Copy it over. */
i = 0;
while (*cursor != '\r' && i < IDENT_USERNAME_MAX)
ident_user[i++] = *cursor++;
/*
* Talk to the ident server on host "remote_ip_addr" and find out who
* owns the tcp connection from his port "remote_port" to port
- * "local_port_addr" on host "local_ip_addr". Return the username the
+ * "local_port_addr" on host "local_ip_addr". Return the user name the
* ident server gives as "*ident_user".
*
* IP addresses and port numbers are in network byte order.
#endif
}
+
+
/*
* Determine the username of the initiator of the connection described
* by "port". Then look in the usermap file under the usermap
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
-/*
- * Clear and reload tokenized file contents.
- */
-void
-load_hba_and_ident(void)
-{
- load_hba();
- load_ident();
-}
-
-
-/* Character set stuff. Not sure it really belongs in this file. */
-
-#ifdef CYR_RECODE
-
-#define CHARSET_FILE "charset.conf"
-#define MAX_CHARSETS 10
-#define KEY_HOST 1
-#define KEY_BASE 2
-#define KEY_TABLE 3
-
-struct CharsetItem
-{
- char Orig[MAX_TOKEN];
- char Dest[MAX_TOKEN];
- char Table[MAX_TOKEN];
-};
-
-
-static bool
-CharSetInRange(char *buf, int host)
-{
- int valid,
- i,
- FromAddr,
- ToAddr,
- tmp;
- struct in_addr file_ip_addr;
- char *p;
- unsigned int one = 0x80000000,
- NetMask = 0;
- unsigned char mask;
-
- p = strchr(buf, '/');
- if (p)
- {
- *p++ = '\0';
- valid = inet_aton(buf, &file_ip_addr);
- if (valid)
- {
- mask = strtoul(p, 0, 0);
- FromAddr = ntohl(file_ip_addr.s_addr);
- ToAddr = ntohl(file_ip_addr.s_addr);
- for (i = 0; i < mask; i++)
- {
- NetMask |= one;
- one >>= 1;
- }
- FromAddr &= NetMask;
- ToAddr = ToAddr | ~NetMask;
- tmp = ntohl(host);
- return ((unsigned) tmp >= (unsigned) FromAddr &&
- (unsigned) tmp <= (unsigned) ToAddr);
- }
- }
- else
- {
- p = strchr(buf, '-');
- if (p)
- {
- *p++ = '\0';
- valid = inet_aton(buf, &file_ip_addr);
- if (valid)
- {
- FromAddr = ntohl(file_ip_addr.s_addr);
- valid = inet_aton(p, &file_ip_addr);
- if (valid)
- {
- ToAddr = ntohl(file_ip_addr.s_addr);
- tmp = ntohl(host);
- return ((unsigned) tmp >= (unsigned) FromAddr &&
- (unsigned) tmp <= (unsigned) ToAddr);
- }
- }
- }
- else
- {
- valid = inet_aton(buf, &file_ip_addr);
- if (valid)
- {
- FromAddr = file_ip_addr.s_addr;
- return (unsigned) FromAddr == (unsigned) host;
- }
- }
- }
- return false;
-}
-
-void
-GetCharSetByHost(char *TableName, int host, const char *DataDir)
-{
- FILE *file;
- char buf[MAX_TOKEN],
- BaseCharset[MAX_TOKEN],
- OrigCharset[MAX_TOKEN],
- DestCharset[MAX_TOKEN],
- HostCharset[MAX_TOKEN],
- *map_file;
- int key,
- ChIndex = 0,
- c,
- i,
- bufsize;
- struct CharsetItem *ChArray[MAX_CHARSETS];
-
- *TableName = '\0';
- bufsize = (strlen(DataDir) + strlen(CHARSET_FILE) + 2) * sizeof(char);
- map_file = (char *) palloc(bufsize);
- snprintf(map_file, bufsize, "%s/%s", DataDir, CHARSET_FILE);
- file = AllocateFile(map_file, PG_BINARY_R);
- pfree(map_file);
- if (file == NULL)
- {
- /* XXX should we log a complaint? */
- return;
- }
- while ((c = getc(file)) != EOF)
- {
- if (c == '#')
- read_through_eol(file);
- else
- {
- /* Read the key */
- ungetc(c, file);
- next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
- if (buf[0] != '\0')
- {
- key = 0;
- if (strcasecmp(buf, "HostCharset") == 0)
- key = KEY_HOST;
- if (strcasecmp(buf, "BaseCharset") == 0)
- key = KEY_BASE;
- if (strcasecmp(buf, "RecodeTable") == 0)
- key = KEY_TABLE;
- switch (key)
- {
- case KEY_HOST:
- /* Read the host */
- next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
- if (buf[0] != '\0')
- {
- if (CharSetInRange(buf, host))
- {
- /* Read the charset */
- next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
- if (buf[0] != '\0')
- strcpy(HostCharset, buf);
- }
- }
- break;
- case KEY_BASE:
- /* Read the base charset */
- next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
- if (buf[0] != '\0')
- strcpy(BaseCharset, buf);
- break;
- case KEY_TABLE:
- /* Read the original charset */
- next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
- if (buf[0] != '\0')
- {
- strcpy(OrigCharset, buf);
- /* Read the destination charset */
- next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
- if (buf[0] != '\0')
- {
- strcpy(DestCharset, buf);
- /* Read the table filename */
- next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
- if (buf[0] != '\0')
- {
- ChArray[ChIndex] =
- (struct CharsetItem *) palloc(sizeof(struct CharsetItem));
- strcpy(ChArray[ChIndex]->Orig, OrigCharset);
- strcpy(ChArray[ChIndex]->Dest, DestCharset);
- strcpy(ChArray[ChIndex]->Table, buf);
- ChIndex++;
- }
- }
- }
- break;
- }
- read_through_eol(file);
- }
- }
- }
- FreeFile(file);
-
- for (i = 0; i < ChIndex; i++)
- {
- if (strcasecmp(BaseCharset, ChArray[i]->Orig) == 0 &&
- strcasecmp(HostCharset, ChArray[i]->Dest) == 0)
- strncpy(TableName, ChArray[i]->Table, 79);
- pfree(ChArray[i]);
- }
-}
-
-#endif /* CYR_RECODE */
+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2001, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
- * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
- *
- * $Id: password.c,v 1.41 2002/03/04 01:46:03 tgl Exp $
- *
- */
-
-#include
-#include
-
-#include "postgres.h"
-
-#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
-#include
-#endif
-
-#include "libpq/libpq.h"
-#include "libpq/password.h"
-#include "libpq/crypt.h"
-#include "miscadmin.h"
-#include "storage/fd.h"
-
-
-int
-verify_password(const Port *port, const char *user, const char *password)
-{
- char *pw_file_fullname;
- FILE *pw_file;
-
- pw_file_fullname = (char *) palloc(strlen(DataDir) + strlen(port->auth_arg) + 2);
- strcpy(pw_file_fullname, DataDir);
- strcat(pw_file_fullname, "/");
- strcat(pw_file_fullname, port->auth_arg);
-
- pw_file = AllocateFile(pw_file_fullname, PG_BINARY_R);
- if (!pw_file)
- {
- elog(LOG, "verify_password: Unable to open password file \"%s\": %m",
- pw_file_fullname);
-
- pfree(pw_file_fullname);
-
- return STATUS_ERROR;
- }
-
- pfree(pw_file_fullname);
-
- while (!feof(pw_file))
- {
- char pw_file_line[255],
- *p,
- *test_user,
- *test_pw;
-
- if (fgets(pw_file_line, sizeof(pw_file_line), pw_file) == NULL)
- pw_file_line[0] = '\0';
- /* kill the newline */
- if (strlen(pw_file_line) > 0 &&
- pw_file_line[strlen(pw_file_line) - 1] == '\n')
- pw_file_line[strlen(pw_file_line) - 1] = '\0';
-
- p = pw_file_line;
-
- test_user = strtok(p, ":");
- if (!test_user || test_user[0] == '\0')
- continue;
- test_pw = strtok(NULL, ":");
-
- if (strcmp(user, test_user) == 0)
- {
- /* we're outta here one way or the other, so close file */
- FreeFile(pw_file);
-
- /*
- * If the password is empty or "+" then we use the regular
- * pg_shadow passwords. If we use crypt then we have to use
- * pg_shadow passwords no matter what. This is because the
- * current code needs non-encrypted passwords to encrypt with
- * a random salt.
- */
- if (port->auth_method == uaMD5 ||
- port->auth_method == uaCrypt ||
- test_pw == NULL ||
- test_pw[0] == '\0' ||
- strcmp(test_pw, "+") == 0)
- return md5_crypt_verify(port, user, password);
-
- /* external password file is crypt-only */
- if (strcmp(crypt(password, test_pw), test_pw) == 0)
- {
- /* it matched. */
- return STATUS_OK;
- }
-
- elog(LOG, "verify_password: password mismatch for '%s'",
- user);
-
- return STATUS_ERROR;
- }
- }
-
- FreeFile(pw_file);
-
- elog(LOG, "verify_password: user '%s' not found in password file",
- user);
-
- return STATUS_ERROR;
-}
#
# Format:
#
-# host DBNAME IP_ADDRESS ADDRESS_MASK AUTH_TYPE [AUTH_ARGUMENT]
-#
-# DBNAME can be:
-# o a database name
-# o "all", which means the record matches all databases
-# o "sameuser", which means users can only access databases whose name
-# is the same as their username
+# host DATABASE USER IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE
+#
+# DATABASE can be:
+# o a database name
+# o "sameuser", which means a user can only access a database with the
+# same name as their user name
+# o "samegroup", which means a user can only access databases when they
+# are members of a group with the same name as the database name
+# o "all", which matches all databases
+# o a list of database names, separated by commas
+# o a file name containing database names, starting with '@'
+#
+# USER can be:
+# o a user name
+# o "all", which matches all users
+# o a list of user names, separated by commas
+# o a group name, starting with '+'
+# o a file name containing user names, starting with '@'
+#
+# Files read using '@' can contain comma-separated database/user names,
+# or one name per line. The files can also contain comments using '#'.
#
-# IP_ADDRESS and ADDRESS_MASK are standard dotted decimal IP address and
+# IP_ADDRESS and MASK are standard dotted decimal IP address and
# mask values. IP addresses can only be specified numerically, not as
# domain or host names.
#
# Do not prevent the superuser from accessing the template1 database.
# Various utility commands need access to template1.
#
-# AUTH_TYPE and AUTH_ARGUMENT are described below.
+# AUTH_TYPE is described below.
#
#
# hostssl
#
# The format of this record is identical to "host".
#
-#
-#
-# It specifies hosts that required connection via secure SSL. "host"
-# records allow SSL connections too, but "hostssl" only allows SSL-secured
+# It specifies hosts that require connection via secure SSL. "host"
+# allows SSL connections too, but "hostssl" requires SSL-secured
# connections.
#
# This keyword is only available if the server was compiled with SSL
# connections. Without this record, UNIX-socket connections are disallowed
#
# Format:
-# local DBNAME AUTH_TYPE [AUTH_ARGUMENT]
+# local DATABASE USER AUTH_TYPE
#
# This format is identical to the "host" record type except there are no
-# IP_ADDRESS and ADDRESS_MASK fields.
+# IP_ADDRESS and MASK fields.
#
#
#
# has an AUTH_TYPE.
#
# trust:
-# No authentication is done. Any valid username is accepted,
+# No authentication is done. Any valid user name is accepted,
# including the PostgreSQL superuser. This option should
# be used only for hosts where all users are trusted.
#
-# password:
-# Authentication is done by matching a password supplied
-# in clear by the host. If no AUTH_ARGUMENT is used, the
-# password is compared with the user's entry in the
-# pg_shadow table.
-#
-# If AUTH_ARGUMENT is specified, the username is looked up
-# in that file in the $PGDATA directory. If the username
-# is found but there is no password, the password is looked
-# up in pg_shadow. If a password exists in the file, it is
-# used instead. These secondary files allow fine-grained
-# control over who can access which databases and whether
-# a non-default password is required. The same file can be
-# used in multiple records for easier administration.
-# Password files can be maintained with the pg_passwd(1)
-# utility. Remember, these passwords override pg_shadow
-# passwords. Also, such passwords are passed over the network
-# in cleartext, meaning this should not be used on untrusted
-# networks.
-#
# md5:
-# Same as "password", except the password is encrypted over the
-# network. This method is preferable to "password" and "crypt"
-# except for pre-7.2 clients that don't support it. NOTE: md5 can
-# use usernames stored in secondary password files but ignores
-# passwords stored there. The pg_shadow password will always be
-# used.
+# Requires the client to supply an MD5 encrypted password for
+# authentication. This is the only method that allows encrypted
+# passwords to be stored in pg_shadow.
#
# crypt:
-# Same as "md5", but uses crypt for pre-7.2 clients. You can
-# not store encrypted passwords in pg_shadow if you use this
-# method.
+# Same as "md5", but uses crypt for pre-7.2 clients.
#
+# password:
+# Same as "md5", but the password is sent in cleartext over
+# the network. This should not be used on untrusted
+# networks.
+#
# ident:
# For TCP/IP connections, authentication is done by contacting the
# ident server on the client host. This is only as secure as the
-# client machine. On machines that support unix-domain socket
-# credentials (currently Linux, FreeBSD, NetBSD, and BSD/OS), this
-# method also works for "local" connections.
+# client machine. You must specify the map name after the 'ident'
+# keyword. It determines how to map remote user names to
+# PostgreSQL user names. If you use "sameuser", the user names are
+# assumed to be identical. If not, the map name is looked up
+# in the $PGDATA/pg_ident.conf file. The connection is accepted if
+# that file contains an entry for this map name with the
+# ident-supplied username and the requested PostgreSQL username.
#
-# AUTH_ARGUMENT is required. It determines how to map remote user
-# names to PostgreSQL user names. If you use "sameuser", the user
-# names are assumed to be the identical. If not, AUTH_ARGUMENT is
-# assumed to be a map name found in the $PGDATA/pg_ident.conf
-# file. The connection is accepted if that file contains an entry
-# for this map name with the ident-supplied username and the
-# requested PostgreSQL username.
+# On machines that support unix-domain socket credentials
+# (currently Linux, FreeBSD, NetBSD, and BSD/OS), ident allows
+# reliable authentication of 'local' connections without ident
+# running on the local machine.
#
# krb4:
# Kerberos V4 authentication is used. Allowed only for
# TCP/IP connections, not for local UNIX-domain sockets.
#
# pam:
-# Authentication is passed off to PAM (PostgreSQL must be
-# configured --with-pam), using the default service name
-# "postgresql" - you can specify your own service name by
-# setting AUTH_ARGUMENT to the desired service name.
+# Authentication is done by PAM using the default service name
+# "postgresql". You can specify your own service name by adding
+# the service name after the 'pam' keyword. To use this option,
+# PostgreSQL must be configured --with-pam.
#
# reject:
# Reject the connection. This is used to reject certain hosts
# Allow any user on the local system to connect to any database under any
# username using Unix-domain sockets (the default for local connections):
#
-# TYPE DATABASE IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE AUTH_ARGUMENT
-# local all trust
+# TYPE DATABASE USER IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE
+# local all all trust
#
# The same using local loopback TCP/IP connections:
#
-# TYPE DATABASE IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE AUTH_ARGUMENT
-# host all 127.0.0.1 255.255.255.255 trust
+# TYPE DATABASE USER IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE
+# host all all 127.0.0.1 255.255.255.255 trust
#
# Allow any user from any host with IP address 192.168.93.x to
# connect to database "template1" as the same username that ident reports
# for the connection (typically his Unix username):
#
-# TYPE DATABASE IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE AUTH_ARGUMENT
-# host template1 192.168.93.0 255.255.255.0 ident sameuser
+# TYPE DATABASE USER IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE
+# host template1 all 192.168.93.0 255.255.255.0 ident sameuser
#
# Allow a user from host 192.168.12.10 to connect to database "template1"
-# if the user's password in pg_shadow is correctly supplied:
+# if the user's password is correctly supplied:
#
-# TYPE DATABASE IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE AUTH_ARGUMENT
-# host template1 192.168.12.10 255.255.255.255 md5
+# TYPE DATABASE USER IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE
+# host template1 all 192.168.12.10 255.255.255.255 md5
#
# In the absence of preceding "host" lines, these two lines will reject
# all connection from 192.168.54.1 (since that entry will be matched
# first), but allow Kerberos V5 connections from anywhere else on the
# Internet. The zero mask means that no bits of the host IP address are
-# considered, so it matches any host:
+# considered so it matches any host:
#
#
-# TYPE DATABASE IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE AUTH_ARGUMENT
-# host all 192.168.54.1 255.255.255.255 reject
-# host all 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 krb5
+# TYPE DATABASE USER IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE
+# host all all 192.168.54.1 255.255.255.255 reject
+# host all all 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 krb5
#
# Allow users from 192.168.x.x hosts to connect to any database if they
# pass the ident check. For example, if ident says the user is "james" and
# he requests to connect as PostgreSQL user "guest", the connection is
# allowed if there is an entry in $PGDATA/pg_ident.conf with map name
# "phoenix" that says "james" is allowed to connect as "guest":
+# See $PGDATA/pg_ident.conf for more information on Ident maps.
#
-# TYPE DATABASE IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE AUTH_ARGUMENT
-# host all 192.168.0.0 255.255.0.0 ident phoenix
+# TYPE DATABASE USER IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE
+# host all all 192.168.0.0 255.255.0.0 ident phoenix
+#
+# If these are the only three lines for local connections, they will
+# allow local users to connect only to their own databases (databases
+# with the same name as their user name) except for administrators and
+# members of group 'support' who may connect to all databases . The file
+# $PGDATA/admins contains a list of user names. Passwords are required in
+# all cases.
+#
+# TYPE DATABASE USER IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE
+# local sameuser all md5
+# local all @admins md5
+# local all +support md5
+#
+# The last two lines above can be combined into a single line:
+#
+# local all @admins,+support md5
+#
+# The database column can also use lists and file names, but not groups:
+#
+# local db1,db2,@demodbs all md5
#
-# If these are the only two lines for local connections, they will allow
-# local users to connect only to their own databases (databases with the
-# same name as their user name) except for administrators who may connect
-# to all databases. The file $PGDATA/admins lists the user names who are
-# permitted to connect to all databases. Passwords are required in all
-# cases. (If you prefer to use ident authorization, an ident map can
-# serve a parallel purpose to the password list file used here.)
#
-# TYPE DATABASE IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE AUTH_ARGUMENT
-# local sameuser md5
-# local all md5 admins
#
-# See $PGDATA/pg_ident.conf for more information on Ident maps.
#
#
#
# configuration is probably too liberal for you. Change it to use
# something other than "trust" authentication.
#
-# TYPE DATABASE IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE AUTH_ARGUMENT
+# TYPE DATABASE USER IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE
-local all trust
-host all 127.0.0.1 255.255.255.255 trust
+local all all trust
+host all all 127.0.0.1 255.255.255.255 trust
*
*
* IDENTIFICATION
- * $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c,v 1.271 2002/03/15 19:20:35 tgl Exp $
+ * $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c,v 1.272 2002/04/04 04:25:48 momjian Exp $
*
* NOTES
*
/*
* Load cached files for client authentication.
*/
- load_hba_and_ident();
- load_password_cache();
+ load_hba();
+ load_ident();
+ load_user();
+ load_group();
/*
* We're ready to rock and roll...
elog(LOG, "Received SIGHUP, reloading configuration files");
SignalChildren(SIGHUP);
ProcessConfigFile(PGC_SIGHUP);
- load_hba_and_ident();
+ load_hba();
+ load_ident();
}
PG_SETMASK(&UnBlockSig);
if (CheckPostmasterSignal(PMSIGNAL_PASSWORD_CHANGE))
{
/*
- * Password file has changed.
+ * Password or group file has changed.
*/
- load_password_cache();
+ load_user();
+ load_group();
}
if (CheckPostmasterSignal(PMSIGNAL_WAKEN_CHILDREN))
*
*
* IDENTIFICATION
- * $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/utils/adt/quote.c,v 1.6 2001/10/28 06:25:53 momjian Exp $
+ * $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/utils/adt/quote.c,v 1.7 2002/04/04 04:25:49 momjian Exp $
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
{
if (*cp1 == '"')
*cp2++ = '"';
- if (*cp1 == '\\')
- *cp2++ = '\\';
*cp2++ = *cp1++;
}
*cp2++ = '"';
if (*cp1 == '"')
*cp2++ = '"';
- if (*cp1 == '\\')
- *cp2++ = '\\';
*cp2++ = *cp1++;
len--;
*
*
* IDENTIFICATION
- * $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/utils/init/miscinit.c,v 1.85 2002/03/04 04:45:27 tgl Exp $
+ * $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/utils/init/miscinit.c,v 1.86 2002/04/04 04:25:49 momjian Exp $
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#ifdef CYR_RECODE
-#define MAX_TOKEN 80
-
-/*
- * Some standard C libraries, including GNU, have an isblank() function.
- * Others, including Solaris, do not. So we have our own.
- */
-static bool
-isblank(const char c)
-{
- return c == ' ' || c == '\t';
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Grab one token out of fp. Tokens are strings of non-blank
- * characters bounded by blank characters, beginning of line, and end
- * of line. Blank means space or tab. Return the token as *buf.
- * Leave file positioned to character immediately after the token or
- * EOF, whichever comes first. If no more tokens on line, return null
- * string as *buf and position file to beginning of next line or EOF,
- * whichever comes first.
- */
-static void
-next_token(FILE *fp, char *buf, const int bufsz)
-{
- int c;
- char *eb = buf + (bufsz - 1);
-
- /* Move over initial token-delimiting blanks */
- while ((c = getc(fp)) != EOF && isblank(c))
- ;
-
- if (c != EOF && c != '\n')
- {
- /*
- * build a token in buf of next characters up to EOF, eol, or
- * blank. If the token gets too long, we still parse it
- * correctly, but the excess characters are not stored into *buf.
- */
- while (c != EOF && c != '\n' && !isblank(c))
- {
- if (buf < eb)
- *buf++ = c;
- c = getc(fp);
- }
-
- /*
- * Put back the char right after the token (critical in case it is
- * eol, since we need to detect end-of-line at next call).
- */
- if (c != EOF)
- ungetc(c, fp);
- }
- *buf = '\0';
-}
-
-
-static void
-read_through_eol(FILE *file)
-{
- int c;
-
- while ((c = getc(file)) != EOF && c != '\n')
- ;
-}
-
-
-void
SetCharSet(void)
{
FILE *file;
- char *p;
+ char *filename;
char *map_file;
char buf[MAX_TOKEN];
int i,
c;
unsigned char FromChar,
ToChar;
- char ChTable[80];
+ char ChTable[MAX_TOKEN];
for (i = 0; i < 128; i++)
{
if (IsUnderPostmaster)
{
GetCharSetByHost(ChTable, MyProcPort->raddr.in.sin_addr.s_addr, DataDir);
- p = ChTable;
+ filename = ChTable;
}
else
- p = getenv("PG_RECODETABLE");
+ filename = getenv("PG_RECODETABLE");
- if (p && *p != '\0')
+ if (filename && *filename != '\0')
{
- map_file = palloc(strlen(DataDir) + strlen(p) + 2);
- sprintf(map_file, "%s/%s", DataDir, p);
- file = AllocateFile(map_file, PG_BINARY_R);
+ map_file = palloc(strlen(DataDir) + strlen(filename) + 2);
+ sprintf(map_file, "%s/%s", DataDir, filename);
+ file = AllocateFile(map_file, "r");
pfree(map_file);
if (file == NULL)
return;
- while ((c = getc(file)) != EOF)
+
+ while (!feof(file))
{
- if (c == '#')
- read_through_eol(file);
- else
+ next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (buf[0] != '\0')
{
- /* Read the FromChar */
- ungetc(c, file);
+ FromChar = strtoul(buf, 0, 0);
+ /* Read the ToChar */
next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (buf[0] != '\0')
{
- FromChar = strtoul(buf, 0, 0);
- /* Read the ToChar */
- next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
- if (buf[0] != '\0')
+ ToChar = strtoul(buf, 0, 0);
+ RecodeForwTable[FromChar - 128] = ToChar;
+ RecodeBackTable[ToChar - 128] = FromChar;
+
+ /* read to EOL */
+ while (!feof(file) && buf[0])
{
- ToChar = strtoul(buf, 0, 0);
- RecodeForwTable[FromChar - 128] = ToChar;
- RecodeBackTable[ToChar - 128] = FromChar;
- read_through_eol(file);
+ next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ elog(LOG, "SetCharSet: unknown tag %s in file %s"
+ buf, filename);
}
}
}
}
}
+
char *
convertstr(unsigned char *buff, int len, int dest)
{
}
return ch;
}
-#endif
+
+#define CHARSET_FILE "charset.conf"
+#define MAX_CHARSETS 10
+#define KEY_HOST 1
+#define KEY_BASE 2
+#define KEY_TABLE 3
+
+struct CharsetItem
+{
+ char Orig[MAX_TOKEN];
+ char Dest[MAX_TOKEN];
+ char Table[MAX_TOKEN];
+};
+
+
+static bool
+CharSetInRange(char *buf, int host)
+{
+ int valid,
+ i,
+ FromAddr,
+ ToAddr,
+ tmp;
+ struct in_addr file_ip_addr;
+ char *p;
+ unsigned int one = 0x80000000,
+ NetMask = 0;
+ unsigned char mask;
+
+ p = strchr(buf, '/');
+ if (p)
+ {
+ *p++ = '\0';
+ valid = inet_aton(buf, &file_ip_addr);
+ if (valid)
+ {
+ mask = strtoul(p, 0, 0);
+ FromAddr = ntohl(file_ip_addr.s_addr);
+ ToAddr = ntohl(file_ip_addr.s_addr);
+ for (i = 0; i < mask; i++)
+ {
+ NetMask |= one;
+ one >>= 1;
+ }
+ FromAddr &= NetMask;
+ ToAddr = ToAddr | ~NetMask;
+ tmp = ntohl(host);
+ return ((unsigned) tmp >= (unsigned) FromAddr &&
+ (unsigned) tmp <= (unsigned) ToAddr);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ p = strchr(buf, '-');
+ if (p)
+ {
+ *p++ = '\0';
+ valid = inet_aton(buf, &file_ip_addr);
+ if (valid)
+ {
+ FromAddr = ntohl(file_ip_addr.s_addr);
+ valid = inet_aton(p, &file_ip_addr);
+ if (valid)
+ {
+ ToAddr = ntohl(file_ip_addr.s_addr);
+ tmp = ntohl(host);
+ return ((unsigned) tmp >= (unsigned) FromAddr &&
+ (unsigned) tmp <= (unsigned) ToAddr);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ valid = inet_aton(buf, &file_ip_addr);
+ if (valid)
+ {
+ FromAddr = file_ip_addr.s_addr;
+ return (unsigned) FromAddr == (unsigned) host;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+
+static void
+GetCharSetByHost(char *TableName, int host, const char *DataDir)
+{
+ FILE *file;
+ char buf[MAX_TOKEN],
+ BaseCharset[MAX_TOKEN],
+ OrigCharset[MAX_TOKEN],
+ DestCharset[MAX_TOKEN],
+ HostCharset[MAX_TOKEN],
+ *map_file;
+ int key,
+ ChIndex = 0,
+ c,
+ i,
+ bufsize;
+ struct CharsetItem *ChArray[MAX_CHARSETS];
+
+ *TableName = '\0';
+ bufsize = (strlen(DataDir) + strlen(CHARSET_FILE) + 2) * sizeof(char);
+ map_file = (char *) palloc(bufsize);
+ snprintf(map_file, bufsize, "%s/%s", DataDir, CHARSET_FILE);
+ file = AllocateFile(map_file, "r");
+ pfree(map_file);
+ if (file == NULL)
+ {
+ /* XXX should we log a complaint? */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ while (!feof(file))
+ {
+ next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (buf[0] != '\0')
+ {
+ key = 0;
+ if (strcasecmp(buf, "HostCharset") == 0)
+ key = KEY_HOST;
+ else if (strcasecmp(buf, "BaseCharset") == 0)
+ key = KEY_BASE;
+ else if (strcasecmp(buf, "RecodeTable") == 0)
+ key = KEY_TABLE;
+ else
+ elog(LOG, "GetCharSetByHost: unknown tag %s in file %s"
+ buf, CHARSET_FILE);
+
+ switch (key)
+ {
+ case KEY_HOST:
+ /* Read the host */
+ next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (buf[0] != '\0')
+ {
+ if (CharSetInRange(buf, host))
+ {
+ /* Read the charset */
+ next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (buf[0] != '\0')
+ strcpy(HostCharset, buf);
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ case KEY_BASE:
+ /* Read the base charset */
+ next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (buf[0] != '\0')
+ strcpy(BaseCharset, buf);
+ break;
+ case KEY_TABLE:
+ /* Read the original charset */
+ next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (buf[0] != '\0')
+ {
+ strcpy(OrigCharset, buf);
+ /* Read the destination charset */
+ next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (buf[0] != '\0')
+ {
+ strcpy(DestCharset, buf);
+ /* Read the table filename */
+ next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (buf[0] != '\0')
+ {
+ ChArray[ChIndex] =
+ (struct CharsetItem *) palloc(sizeof(struct CharsetItem));
+ strcpy(ChArray[ChIndex]->Orig, OrigCharset);
+ strcpy(ChArray[ChIndex]->Dest, DestCharset);
+ strcpy(ChArray[ChIndex]->Table, buf);
+ ChIndex++;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* read to EOL */
+ while (!feof(file) && buf[0])
+ {
+ next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ elog(LOG, "GetCharSetByHost: unknown tag %s in file %s"
+ buf, CHARSET_FILE);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ FreeFile(file);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ChIndex; i++)
+ {
+ if (strcasecmp(BaseCharset, ChArray[i]->Orig) == 0 &&
+ strcasecmp(HostCharset, ChArray[i]->Dest) == 0)
+ strncpy(TableName, ChArray[i]->Table, 79);
+ pfree(ChArray[i]);
+ }
+}
+
+#endif /* CYR_RECODE */
# Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2001, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
# Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
#
-# $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/bin/Makefile,v 1.34 2001/02/18 18:33:59 momjian Exp $
+# $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/bin/Makefile,v 1.35 2002/04/04 04:25:50 momjian Exp $
#
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------
include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
DIRS := initdb initlocation ipcclean pg_ctl pg_dump pg_id \
- pg_passwd psql scripts pg_config
+ psql scripts pg_config
ifdef MULTIBYTE
DIRS += pg_encoding
# Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2001, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
# Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
#
-# $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/bin/initdb/Attic/initdb.sh,v 1.146 2002/04/03 05:39:32 petere Exp $
+# $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/bin/initdb/Attic/initdb.sh,v 1.147 2002/04/04 04:25:50 momjian Exp $
#
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------
"$PGPATH"/postgres $PGSQL_OPT template1 >/dev/null <
-- Create a trigger so that direct updates to pg_shadow will be written
--- to the flat password file pg_pwd
+-- to the flat password/group files pg_pwd and pg_group
CREATE TRIGGER pg_sync_pg_pwd AFTER INSERT OR UPDATE OR DELETE ON pg_shadow \
-FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE PROCEDURE update_pg_pwd();
+FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE PROCEDURE update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group();
+CREATE TRIGGER pg_sync_pg_group AFTER INSERT OR UPDATE OR DELETE ON pg_group \
+FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE PROCEDURE update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group();
-- needs to be done before alter user, because alter user checks that
-- pg_shadow is secure ...
REVOKE ALL on pg_shadow FROM public;
echo "The password file wasn't generated. Please report this problem." 1>&2
exit_nicely
fi
+ if [ ! -f "$PGDATA"/global/pg_group ]; then
+ echo
+ echo "The group file wasn't generated. Please report this problem." 1>&2
+ exit_nicely
+ fi
echo "ok"
fi
+++ /dev/null
-# $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/bin/pg_passwd/Attic/Makefile,v 1.14 2001/05/12 19:49:47 petere Exp $
-
-subdir = src/bin/pg_passwd
-top_builddir = ../../..
-include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
-
-OBJS = pg_passwd.o
-ifdef STRDUP
-OBJS += $(top_builddir)/src/utils/strdup.o
-endif
-
-all: pg_passwd
-
-pg_passwd: $(OBJS)
- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) $^ $(LIBS) -o $@
-
-$(top_builddir)/src/utils/strdup.o:
- $(MAKE) -C $(top_builddir)/src/utils strdup.o
-
-install: all installdirs
- $(INSTALL_PROGRAM) pg_passwd$(X) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/pg_passwd$(X)
-
-installdirs:
- $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)
-
-uninstall:
- rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/pg_passwd$(X)
-
-depend dep:
- $(CC) -MM $(CFLAGS) *.c >depend
-
-clean distclean maintainer-clean:
- rm -f pg_passwd$(X) pg_passwd.o
-
-ifeq (depend,$(wildcard depend))
-include depend
-endif
+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * @(#) pg_passwd.c 1.8 09:13:16 97/07/02 Y. Ichikawa
- */
-#include "postgres_fe.h"
-
-#include
-#include
-#include
-#include
-#define issaltchar(c) (isalnum((unsigned char) (c)) || (c) == '.' || (c) == '/')
-
-#ifdef HAVE_TERMIOS_H
-#include
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
-#include
-#else
-extern char *crypt(const char *, const char *);
-#endif
-
-/*
- * We assume that the output of crypt(3) is always 13 characters,
- * and that at most 8 characters can usefully be sent to it.
- *
- * Postgres usernames are assumed to be less than NAMEDATALEN chars long.
- */
-#define CLEAR_PASSWD_LEN 8 /* not including null */
-#define CRYPTED_PASSWD_LEN 13 /* not including null */
-
-const char *progname;
-
-static void usage(void);
-static void read_pwd_file(char *filename);
-static void write_pwd_file(char *filename, char *bkname);
-static void encrypt_pwd(char key[CLEAR_PASSWD_LEN + 1],
- char salt[3],
- char passwd[CRYPTED_PASSWD_LEN + 1]);
-static void prompt_for_username(char *username);
-static void prompt_for_password(char *prompt, char *password);
-
-static void
-usage(void)
-{
- printf("%s manipulates flat text password files for PostgreSQL.\n\n", progname);
- printf("Usage:\n %s PASSWORD-FILE\n\n", progname);
- printf("Report bugs to
.\n");-}
-
-typedef struct
-{
- char *uname;
- char *pwd;
- char *rest;
-} pg_pwd;
-
-#define MAXPWDS 1024
-
-pg_pwd pwds[MAXPWDS];
-int npwds = 0;
-
-
-static void
-read_pwd_file(char *filename)
-{
- FILE *fp;
- static char line[512];
- static char ans[128];
- int i;
-
-try_again:
- fp = fopen(filename, PG_BINARY_R);
- if (fp == NULL)
- {
- if (errno == ENOENT)
- {
- printf("File \"%s\" does not exist. Create? (y/n): ", filename);
- fflush(stdout);
- if (fgets(ans, sizeof(ans), stdin) == NULL)
- exit(1);
- switch (ans[0])
- {
- case 'y':
- case 'Y':
- fp = fopen(filename, PG_BINARY_W);
- if (fp == NULL)
- {
- perror(filename);
- exit(1);
- }
- fclose(fp);
- goto try_again;
- default:
- /* cannot continue */
- exit(1);
- }
- }
- else
- {
- perror(filename);
- exit(1);
- }
- }
-
- /* read all the entries */
- for (npwds = 0;
- npwds < MAXPWDS && fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp) != NULL;
- ++npwds)
- {
- int l;
- char *p,
- *q;
-
- l = strlen(line);
- if (line[l - 1] == '\n')
- line[l - 1] = '\0';
- else
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: line too long\n",
- filename, npwds + 1);
- exit(1);
- }
-
- /* get user name */
- p = line;
- if ((q = strchr(p, ':')) != NULL)
- *q = '\0';
-
- if (strlen(p) == 0)
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: null user name\n",
- filename, npwds + 1);
- exit(1);
- }
- pwds[npwds].uname = strdup(p);
-
- /* check for duplicate user name */
- for (i = 0; i < npwds; ++i)
- {
- if (strcmp(pwds[i].uname, pwds[npwds].uname) == 0)
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "Duplicate username %s in entry %d\n",
- pwds[npwds].uname, npwds + 1);
- exit(1);
- }
- }
-
- /* get password field */
- if (q)
- {
- p = q + 1;
- q = strchr(p, ':');
-
- if (q != NULL)
- *(q++) = '\0';
-
- if (strlen(p) != CRYPTED_PASSWD_LEN && strcmp(p, "+") != 0)
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: warning: invalid password length\n",
- filename, npwds + 1);
- }
- pwds[npwds].pwd = strdup(p);
- }
- else
- pwds[npwds].pwd = NULL;
-
- /* rest of the line is treated as is */
- if (q == NULL)
- pwds[npwds].rest = NULL;
- else
- pwds[npwds].rest = strdup(q);
- }
-
- fclose(fp);
-}
-
-static void
-write_pwd_file(char *filename, char *bkname)
-{
- FILE *fp;
- int i;
-
- /* make the backup file */
-link_again:
- if (link(filename, bkname))
- {
- if (errno == EEXIST)
- {
- unlink(bkname);
- goto link_again;
- }
- perror(bkname);
- exit(1);
- }
- if (unlink(filename))
- {
- perror(filename);
- exit(1);
- }
-
- /* open file */
- if ((fp = fopen(filename, PG_BINARY_W)) == NULL)
- {
- perror(filename);
- exit(1);
- }
-
- /* write file */
- for (i = 0; i < npwds; ++i)
- {
- fprintf(fp, "%s", pwds[i].uname);
- if (pwds[i].pwd)
- fprintf(fp, ":%s", pwds[i].pwd);
- if (pwds[i].rest)
- fprintf(fp, ":%s", pwds[i].rest);
- fprintf(fp, "\n");
- }
-
- fclose(fp);
-}
-
-static void
-encrypt_pwd(char key[CLEAR_PASSWD_LEN + 1],
- char salt[3],
- char passwd[CRYPTED_PASSWD_LEN + 1])
-{
- int n;
-
- /* select a salt, if not already given */
- if (salt[0] == '\0')
- {
- srand(time(NULL));
- do
- {
- n = rand() % 256;
- } while (!issaltchar(n));
- salt[0] = n;
- do
- {
- n = rand() % 256;
- } while (!issaltchar(n));
- salt[1] = n;
- salt[2] = '\0';
- }
-
- /* get encrypted password */
- strcpy(passwd, crypt(key, salt));
-
-#ifdef PG_PASSWD_DEBUG
- /* show it */
- fprintf(stderr, "key = %s, salt = %s, password = %s\n",
- key, salt, passwd);
-#endif
-}
-
-static void
-prompt_for_username(char *username)
-{
- int length;
-
- printf("Username: ");
- fflush(stdout);
- if (fgets(username, NAMEDATALEN, stdin) == NULL)
- username[0] = '\0';
-
- length = strlen(username);
- if (length > 0 && username[length - 1] != '\n')
- {
- /* eat rest of the line */
- char buf[128];
- int buflen;
-
- do
- {
- if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL)
- break;
- buflen = strlen(buf);
- } while (buflen > 0 && buf[buflen - 1] != '\n');
- }
- if (length > 0 && username[length - 1] == '\n')
- username[length - 1] = '\0';
-}
-
-static void
-prompt_for_password(char *prompt, char *password)
-{
- int length;
-
-#ifdef HAVE_TERMIOS_H
- struct termios t_orig,
- t;
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_TERMIOS_H
- tcgetattr(0, &t);
- t_orig = t;
- t.c_lflag &= ~ECHO;
- tcsetattr(0, TCSADRAIN, &t);
-#endif
-
- printf(prompt);
- fflush(stdout);
-
- if (fgets(password, CLEAR_PASSWD_LEN + 1, stdin) == NULL)
- password[0] = '\0';
-
-#ifdef HAVE_TERMIOS_H
- tcsetattr(0, TCSADRAIN, &t_orig);
-#endif
-
- length = strlen(password);
- if (length > 0 && password[length - 1] != '\n')
- {
- /* eat rest of the line */
- char buf[128];
- int buflen;
-
- do
- {
- if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL)
- break;
- buflen = strlen(buf);
- } while (buflen > 0 && buf[buflen - 1] != '\n');
- }
- if (length > 0 && password[length - 1] == '\n')
- password[length - 1] = '\0';
- printf("\n");
-}
-
-
-int
-main(int argc, char *argv[])
-{
- char *filename;
- char bkname[MAXPGPATH];
- char username[NAMEDATALEN];
- char salt[3];
- char key[CLEAR_PASSWD_LEN + 1],
- key2[CLEAR_PASSWD_LEN + 1];
- char e_passwd[CRYPTED_PASSWD_LEN + 1];
- int i;
-
- progname = argv[0];
-
- if (argc != 2)
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s: too %s arguments\nTry '%s --help' for more information.\n",
- progname, argc > 2 ? "many" : "few", progname);
- exit(1);
- }
-
- if (strcmp(argv[1], "--help") == 0 || strcmp(argv[1], "-?") == 0)
- {
- usage();
- exit(0);
- }
- if (strcmp(argv[1], "--version") == 0 || strcmp(argv[1], "-V") == 0)
- {
- puts("pg_passwd (PostgreSQL) " PG_VERSION);
- exit(0);
- }
- if (argv[1][0] == '-')
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid option: %s\nTry '%s --help' for more information.\n",
- progname, argv[1], progname);
- exit(1);
- }
-
- filename = argv[1];
-
- /* open file */
- read_pwd_file(filename);
-
- /* ask for the user name and the password */
- prompt_for_username(username);
- prompt_for_password("New password: ", key);
- prompt_for_password("Re-enter new password: ", key2);
- if (strcmp(key, key2) != 0)
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "Password mismatch\n");
- exit(1);
- }
- salt[0] = '\0';
- encrypt_pwd(key, salt, e_passwd);
-
- /* check password entry */
- for (i = 0; i < npwds; ++i)
- {
- if (strcmp(pwds[i].uname, username) == 0)
- { /* found */
- pwds[i].pwd = strdup(e_passwd);
- break;
- }
- }
- if (i == npwds)
- { /* did not exist */
- if (npwds == MAXPWDS)
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "Cannot handle so many entries\n");
- exit(1);
- }
- pwds[npwds].uname = strdup(username);
- pwds[npwds].pwd = strdup(e_passwd);
- pwds[npwds].rest = NULL;
- ++npwds;
- }
-
- /* write back the file */
- sprintf(bkname, "%s.bk", filename);
- write_pwd_file(filename, bkname);
-
- return 0;
-}
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2001, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
*
- * $Id: pg_proc.h,v 1.224 2002/03/29 19:06:19 tgl Exp $
+ * $Id: pg_proc.h,v 1.225 2002/04/04 04:25:52 momjian Exp $
*
* NOTES
* The script catalog/genbki.sh reads this file and generates .bki
DATA(insert OID = 1637 ( like_escape PGUID 12 f t t t 2 f 25 "25 25" 100 0 0 100 like_escape - _null_ ));
DESCR("convert match pattern to use backslash escapes");
-DATA(insert OID = 1689 ( update_pg_pwd PGUID 12 f t f t 0 f 0 "" 100 0 0 100 update_pg_pwd - _null_ ));
-DESCR("update pg_pwd file");
+DATA(insert OID = 1689 ( update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group PGUID 12 f t f t 0 f 0 "" 100 0 0 100 update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group - _null_ ));
+DESCR("update pg_pwd and pg_group files");
/* Oracle Compatibility Related Functions - By Edmund Mergl */
DATA(insert OID = 868 ( strpos PGUID 12 f t t t 2 f 23 "25 25" 100 0 0 100 textpos - _null_ ));
* user.h
*
*
- * $Id: user.h,v 1.17 2002/03/01 22:45:17 petere Exp $
+ * $Id: user.h,v 1.18 2002/04/04 04:25:53 momjian Exp $
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#ifndef USER_H
#define USER_H
+#include "fmgr.h"
#include "nodes/parsenodes.h"
+#define PWD_FILE "pg_pwd"
+
+#define USER_GROUP_FILE "pg_group"
+
+
+extern char *group_getfilename(void);
+extern char *user_getfilename(void);
extern void CreateUser(CreateUserStmt *stmt);
extern void AlterUser(AlterUserStmt *stmt);
extern void AlterUserSet(AlterUserSetStmt *stmt);
extern void AlterGroup(AlterGroupStmt *stmt, const char *tag);
extern void DropGroup(DropGroupStmt *stmt);
-extern Datum update_pg_pwd(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS);
+extern Datum update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS);
#endif /* USER_H */
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2001, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
*
- * $Id: crypt.h,v 1.19 2001/11/12 01:52:46 momjian Exp $
+ * $Id: crypt.h,v 1.20 2002/04/04 04:25:53 momjian Exp $
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#include "libpq/libpq-be.h"
-#define CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR "\t"
-
/* Also defined in interfaces/odbc/md5.h */
#define MD5_PASSWD_LEN 35
strlen(passwd) == MD5_PASSWD_LEN)
-extern char *crypt_getpwdfilename(void);
-extern void load_password_cache(void);
-
extern int md5_crypt_verify(const Port *port, const char *user,
const char *pgpass);
extern bool md5_hash(const void *buff, size_t len, char *hexsum);
* Interface to hba.c
*
*
- * $Id: hba.h,v 1.31 2001/11/05 17:46:33 momjian Exp $
+ * $Id: hba.h,v 1.32 2002/04/04 04:25:54 momjian Exp $
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#include
#endif
+#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
+
#define CONF_FILE "pg_hba.conf"
/* Name of the config file */
#define USERMAP_FILE "pg_ident.conf"
/* Name of the usermap file */
-#define OLD_CONF_FILE "pg_hba"
- /* Name of the config file in prior releases of Postgres. */
-
#define IDENT_PORT 113
/* Standard TCP port number for Ident service. Assigned by IANA */
typedef struct Port hbaPort;
+#define MAX_TOKEN 256
+
+extern void next_token(FILE *fp, char *buf, const int bufsz);
+extern List **get_user_line(const char *user);
+extern void load_hba(void);
+extern void load_ident(void);
+extern void load_user(void);
+extern void load_group(void);
extern int hba_getauthmethod(hbaPort *port);
extern int authident(hbaPort *port);
-extern void load_hba_and_ident(void);
#endif
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2001, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
*
- * $Id: miscadmin.h,v 1.101 2002/03/04 01:46:04 tgl Exp $
+ * $Id: miscadmin.h,v 1.102 2002/04/04 04:25:51 momjian Exp $
*
* NOTES
* some of the information in this file should be moved to
extern int CheckPathAccess(char *path, char *name, int open_mode);
#ifdef CYR_RECODE
-extern void GetCharSetByHost(char *TableName, int host, const char *DataDir);
extern void SetCharSet(void);
extern char *convertstr(unsigned char *buff, int len, int dest);
#endif
AND p1.proname !~ '^pl[^_]+_call_handler$'
AND p1.proname !~ '^RI_FKey_'
AND p1.proname !~ 'costestimate$'
- AND p1.proname != 'update_pg_pwd';
+ AND p1.proname != 'update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group';
oid | proname
-----+---------
(0 rows)
AND p1.proname !~ '^pl[^_]+_call_handler$'
AND p1.proname !~ '^RI_FKey_'
AND p1.proname !~ 'costestimate$'
- AND p1.proname != 'update_pg_pwd';
+ AND p1.proname != 'update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group';
-- Look for conflicting proc definitions (same names and input datatypes).
-- (This test should be dead code now that we have the unique index
projects / postgresql.git / commitdiff